# DENGEMUN

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Addressing National Security Challenges in the Aftermath of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Under Secretary General

Mirata DEVA

Academic Assistant

Atakan DUMAN

Seize the Moment

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Letter from the Secretary General

Esteemed Participants and Honourable Delegates,

As the Secretary-General of the Denge Anatolian High School Model United Nations conference, I am ecstatic to extend a warm welcome to you during our initial session. My name is Ela Selin Develioğlu, and I am a junior student at Denge Anatolian High School.

Since the year 2021, I have been actively participating in Model United Nations conferences. These conferences have had a significant impact on my life because they have afforded me the chance to foster my personal development in a variety of domains and to connect with a wide variety of people. During the Model United Nations conferences, I wish for each and every one of you delegates to have the same good fortune that I did and to have the most noteworthy experiences that you can possibly have. When we were working on DENGEMUN, our number one goal was to make sure that you had the most enjoyable experience possible.

Prior to concluding, I would like to convey my profound gratitude towards several individuals, starting with our advisors Koray Karasekreter and Nurullah Balcı for providing us with the chance of organising such a conference. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Can Afaracı, the Director General, for their invaluable contributions to the organisation team. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Rojin and Ceylin Atasever, who serve as our Deputy Secretary-General and Deputy Director General, respectively. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Ulaşcan Tunçinan, the Academic Advisor of our conference, for their invaluable guidance. Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Alperen Arifoğlu for his invaluable assistance and supporting me from the very beginning of my journey.

Yours Sincerely,

Secretary-General

Ela Selin Develioğlu

Letter from the Under Secretary General

Esteemed Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I extend a warm welcome to all participants of DENGEMUN'24 Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). We are honoured to have you join us as we embark on a crucial journey to address the critical and ongoing issue of addressing the national security challenges, in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. DISEC will play an important role to address various security challenges, and this committee's aim is to develop effective solutions and measures to mitigate emerging threats to international peace and security.

The Study Guide you are provided with is both comprehensive and detailed, designed to offer context and history to better understand and engage with contemporary issues. I realize it is a substantial document, and it might be challenging to read it from start to finish; chapters under "Preliminary Information" gives information and context on historical and political developments, yet, it does not delve into contemporary issues. Thus, even though it is important for you to read the study guide completely, if you cannot find the time to do so, _I highly encourage and advise you to focus particularly on the chapters under_ **"Contemporary Developments"** and **"National Security Challenges in the Aftermath of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine."** These sections are crucial for keeping up with the debates and the overall flow of the committee.

In this study guide, the first chapter "Introduction to the Committee" gives brief information about the principles and history of the DISEC. The "Preliminary Information" chapter gives you detailed information on the history of the Ukraine and Russian relationships. The emergence of Russia and Ukraine as separate entities, later nation states, is crucial to understand the modern-day debates on the clash of identities and the ongoing war—since Russia use it as a justification. Under the "Contemporary Developments" chapter, you will find necessary information on the international agreements, developments and events that build up, leading to the war. The final chapter "National Security Challenges in the Aftermath of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine" addresses some key concepts that are useful to develop an idea and analytical understanding on what is going on. It continues with information about the war, and the national and international security threats emerged during this process, and how they were addressed by the international community.

I hope that you will enjoy this committee and conference overall. I also want to thank my academic assistant Atakan Duman for his support, encouragement and the efforts he put to the preparation of this guide.

Lastly, you can always reach out to me via e-mail as well.

My e-mail address is: miratadeva2@gmail.com

Best regards,

Under Secretary General

Mirata Deva.

Letter from the Academic Assistant

Highly esteemed delegates,

It is my honor to welcome you all to DENGEMUN'24 Disarmament and International Security Committee. In this committee, we are going to deliberate and find solutions in order to undertake a critical journey to address and find logical solutions in every perspective for national security challenges in the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) has an essential role in addressing this ongoing issue. DISEC shall fulfill their mandates, and mitigate threats to international security, peace, and disarmament globally.

In order to exercise the authority, fulfill the seven mandates and the work of DISEC, and most importantly address the agenda item, I strongly advise you to check the first and second chapters of the study guide that is provided to you. It gives you brief information about the committee's mandate, its structure, its work and its works objectives. Delegates' main objective must be according to DISEC's objective to fully meet the mandates of the committee. As aforementioned by the Under Secretary General, the chapter named "Preliminary Information" gives you elaborated data and knowledge about the political background between parties. The "Contemporary Developments" chapter gives you information on both parties and third parties' involvement from the beginning of the invasion to the current date. The chapter named "National Security Challenges in the Aftermath of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine" gives you all of the information on what you can do to address the situation from your stance and perspective, and it will affect the flow of the committee. Additionally, I encourage you to check definitions of every kind in the study guide, since the definitions in my point of view are one of the most important information that will lead you to the most advanced solutions. Lastly, I advise you to do further research on the topic and your countries' stances on the issue.

From the heart, I anticipate you to have a great time on the committee and the conference, and hope that this committee will educate you in any kind. I especially want to thank my Under Secretary General, Mirata Deva for all of his encouragement, the hardwork, and effort in any kind that he put into this elegant study guide.

If you have any questions, you can contact me anytime you want via my email: atakan.duman821@gmail.com

Kind regards,
Academic Assistant
Atakan Duman

Introduction to the Committee

1. History and Objectives of the DISEC

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is one of the six main committees in the United Nations General Assembly. It was established in 1945 along with the United Nations. DISEC plays a crucial role in dealing with various issues related to disarmament maintaining peace, security, and stability worldwide. Its mandates are essential in ensuring global disarmament and security.

The main objectives of the Disarmament and International Security Committee are to ensure international disarmament, security, arms control, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Its mandates are; the prevention of the usage of nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and other weapons of mass destruction, and taking disarmament measures, international security, regional disarmament and security, aspects of disarmament in outer space, and disarmament machinery. DISEC's responsibilities are critical internationally, since the increase and proliferation of any mass destruction weapons and its usage of any kind may have annihilating consequences globally in terms of security and stability. With all of its work, DISEC is assisting the whole world to live in a much more secure and peaceful world for all.

2. Structure of the DISEC

DISEC comprises all of the 193 member states of the United Nations. Its work is based on the main principles of the UN Charter and other international treaties and conventions associated with DISEC. The committee holds meetings annually every October for a 4-5 week session in New York, United States that all of the member states can attend to discuss new solutions and pass and adopt new resolutions related to disarmament and security globally. Furthermore, DISEC may also hold special meetings and other emergency sessions throughout the year to discuss and adopt measures in case of an emergency associated with DISEC's objectives and principles. As aforementioned, DISEC works closely with other UN bodies and the guidance of international treaties such as; Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Organization of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), to prohibit nuclear weapons and any kind of mass destruction weapons for a safe and disarmed world.

1. The Kyivan Rus

From 7th to 4th century BCE, Persian speaking warrior tribes—the Scythians and the Sarmatians inhabited Ukraine, until they got overrun by Huns, Germanic Goths and Romans around 3rd century BCE. The origins of Slavic people are thought to be from the Carpathian Mountains, which are located in modern day Poland and Western Ukraine, and they spread from there to the Balkans and Russia. According to the mythical "Russian Primary Chronicle" Slavs are a descendent of Noah's third son Japheth. Most of the scholars think that the Slavic people came from the tribal federation of Antes, thought be emerged as early as 2nd century BCE. The Polianians are one of the tribes of this federation, and credited with the foundation of Kyiv in 482 CE. It is thought that the city is named after a Polianian prince called "Kyi". Most probably, this tribe had interactions with the Byzantium Empire and was influenced by Christianity. Antes tribal federation was conquered by Avar Turks in 602 and remained under their rule until the end of Avars in early 800s. Some of the Slavic tribes later fall under the control of Khazar Turks, while others were subjugated by the Scandinavian Varangians (**Map 1**).

The rise of "Rus" state is told be under the infamous ruler Riurik who ruled from Novgorod, expanding his influence and borders to other Slavic tribes. Members of the Novgorod nobility (boyards), Askold and Dir, sailed down Dnieper to Kyiv, took control from the Polianians, even launched an attack on Constantinople, and converted to Christianity. Their reign in Kyiv ended when Oleh, a pagan regent for Riurik's son Ihor, killed them in 882 and proclaimed Kyiv as the new capital and "mother of all Rus cities" according to the Chronicle. Therefore, creating the Kyivan Rus, Oleh expanded his authority and rule over more of the Slavic tribes in the region, securing trade agreements with the Byzantians of Constantinople. Succeeding him, Ihor, failed in his attempts of subduing Constantinople, and internal rebellions of Slavic tribes that did not wanted to pay tribute

Map 1: Lands Inhabited by Slavic Tribes

to rulers in Kyiv challenged his rule. Ihor's wife, Olha, served as a successful regent, to their son Sviatoslav—who was a formidable warrior, defeating the Slavic tribes, Volga Bulgars and Khazars, he expanded his territory as far as the Volga river and the Caspian Sea in the East, and to the Caucasus in the South. In 968 with his alliance with the Byzantians, he captured important cities along the Danube River. However, Constantinople saw his success as a threat and forced him to retreat from Kyiv, during which he was defeated and killed by the Pechenegs—which caused his three sons to fight for the throne. Eldest son Yaropolk established his rule in 972 after killing Oleh, and Volodymyr fleeing to Scandinavia.

In 980, with the help of the Varangians, Volodymyr overthrew his brother and expanded the Kyivan Rus territories from the Carpathians to what are today known as St. Petersburg and Moscow. In 988 he converted from paganism to Orthodox Christianity, starting the conversion process of the Slavic tribes to Christianity. He secured an alliance with the Byzantine Empire, marrying Princess Anna in exchange for his military support to the Byzantine emperors. These steps created the Christian cultural and religious identity that united the Eastern Slavic tribes. Yaroslav the Wise succeeded him, reigning in a golden age. After his death, Yaroslav's heirs started fighting with each other as a result of the inheritance system, preparing the fall and decline of the Kyivan Rus—with the exception of a grandson of Yaroslav the Wise and Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX, Volodymyr Monomakh's short reign of restoration that ended with his death in 1125. During the 12th century many regions gained *de facto* independence from the centre in Kyiv. The decline process came to an end with the Mongols under the command of Batu, grandson of Genghis Khan sacking cities in 1237 and the fall of Kyiv in 1240 (Kubicek 20-30).

1.1. Heritage and Legacy of Kyivan Rus

There is a dispute over who is the legal claimant of the Kyivan Rus as both Belarus, Ukraine and Russia claim to be the continuation of the state of Rus. Russian historians argue that the migration of the population from Kyiv to the North as a result of the Mongol invasion, and founding of Moscow is the start and formation of the modern Russian state. Nonetheless, Ukrainian scholars claim that Kyivan Rus is an ethnically Ukrainian heritage and the continuation of the people of the Rus inhibiting the lands of Ukraine, showing closer linguistic bonds to the modern day Ukrainian. Religious differences are also present, with Moscow following a more Byzantine-influenced centralized practice of Orthodoxy, whereas the Kyivan Rus having more religious independence and tolerance. The consensus is that Kyivan Rus should be considered as the common ancestor of all Eastern Slavic people as there were no national identity and conciseness was created at the time (Kubicek 30-33).

Even though this dispute seems to be a historical debate, similar to looking for answers to who is the rightful successor of the Roman Empire—it was proven to be significant in the contemporary politics as well. This dispute has been "invoked to justify Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. If the Russian interpretation is correct, it is hard to conceive of a separate Ukrainian history or identity, making Ukrainians, as they were once known, 'Little Russians.' Conversely, those favoring the Rus-Ukraine interpretation not only press for a separation between Russians and Ukrainians but argue for both the longer lineage of the Ukrainian people (thereby making Russians, perhaps, 'Little Ukrainians') and the 'superiority' of 'Rus-Ukrainian' culture to that which emerged in Moscow" (Kubicek 32).

2. Ukraine Under the Rule of the Polish and the Lithuanians

2.1. Grand Duchy of Lithuania

In the early 14th century, following the Mongol invasion, there has been a power vacuum caused by Mongolian tribes not being able to fully exercise their authority, as a result of civil wars. Lithuanians, defeating the Teutonic Knights, started to expand Eastwards and occupied Belarus in early 1300s and Ukraine after 1340s. "Grand Prince Algirdas declared, 'All Rus must simply belong to the Lithuanians'" (Kubicek 36). In 1350s they gained the control of cities East of Dnipro and in 1362 they took control of Kyiv, and defeating Mongols in 1363 during the Battle of the Blue Waters, they forged a formidable force and authority over the region. Slavic tribes cooperated with Lithuanians as they were more preferable overlords than the Mongols. By the end of the 14th century, Lithuanian control expanded as far as the Black Sea (**Map 2**). Lithuanians adopted to the

Map 2: Lithuania at the End of the 14th

regional culture of the Slavic people—they converted to Orthodoxy, made the Ruthenian language their official government language and took some legal principles from the Kyivan Rus. The Grand Principality of Lithuania—including Rus and Samogitia, became by the largest political entity in Europe. The rulers named themselves as "Grand Princes of Lithuanians and Ruthenians," indicating to their reign over both the Lithuanians and the local Slavic populace (Kubicek 36).

2.2. Polish Expansion

Under the rule of Casimir the Great, Poles expanded into Ukrainian territories and gained control over Galicia and parts of Volhynia in 1340. The Polish authority was challenged by the Lithuanians, yet conflicts reached to an end in 1366. The Polish influence and domination in Ukraine became powerful after the Union of Krevo in 1385, between Queen Jagwiga, of Poland, and Grand Prince Jagiello of Lithuania—creating a single monarchy **(Map 3)**. The Polish rule in Galicia favoured Catholicism and disregarded the Orthodox Ruthenians. "In Polish-ruled Galicia, Latin, not Ruthenian, was the official language, and Catholic nobles were given land grants in the region in return for supporting the Polish crown. Lithuanian and Ruthenian opposition to the Union of Krevo galvanized around Vytautas, Jagiello's cousin, who in 1392 forced Jagiello to recognize his de facto control over Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands. When Vytautas died in 1430, Jagiello's youngest brother, Svidrigaillo, was elected grand prince and declared a desire to limit or even break off ties with Poland. Polish forces invaded, precipitating a civil war in Lithuanian/Ruthenian lands that focused on their relationship with Poland and the status of the Orthodox population. Svidrigaillo was defeated, and in ensuing years, Polish control over Ukrainian lands expanded. In 1471, Kyiv and its surrounding territories were formally incorporated as a common province of the kingdom, ending any pretense of Ukrainian self-rule" (Kubicek 37).

Map 3: Polish Expansion in the 14ᵗʰ Century

In addition to the local resistance to the Polish rule in the Ukrainian territories, emergence of Moscow as a dominant force in the East, controlling Novgorod and Valdimir, and defeating Mongols in 1480 decisively—posed a greater threat. With the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Moscow claimed itself as the successor of the Roman Empire, with the title of the "Third Rome," and as the centre and protector of the Orthodox faith. The Ruthenian Orthodox population that was repressed by the Catholic Polish rule, sought refuge from Moscow (Kubicek 37-38).

> "In the 1490s, when Moscovite forces approached Chernihiv and other Left Bank cities under a military campaign against Lithuania, many locals welcomed them. In 1508, several Ruthenian nobles, supported by Moscow, rose up against Poland to defend the Orthodox faith. They failed, however, and were forced to flee to Moscow. To the south, the Crimean Khanate, ruled by the Tatars (a faction of the Mongols) and backed by the Ottomans, controlled the Black Sea coast and periodically launched raids into Ukrainian lands along the Dnipro in order to capture slaves and other treasure. In 1482, they destroyed much of Kyiv, apparently in fulfillment of a request made by Tsar Ivan III of Moscow, who had declared himself 'sovereign of all Rus'" (Kubicek 38).

2.3. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

"By the 1500s, it was thus apparent that Lithuania was in decline. In 1522, it lost Chernihiv and Starodub, in what is now north-eastern Ukraine, to Moscow. Raids from the

Crimean Tatars continued. From 1562 to 1570, Lithuania was involved in another major war with Moscow. Facing the prospect of losing much of their territory, the Lithuanians turned to Poland for assistance. The Poles agreed, but only if Poland and Lithuania, which by the terms of the Union of Krevo had a common monarch but de facto preserved much Lithuanian autonomy, joined together as a single political entity. Despite misgivings, Lithuanian and Ruthenian leaders eventually agreed to Polish demands. The result, created by the Union of Lublin in 1569, was the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita)" (Kubicek 38).

Despite the Commonwealth being the Europe's largest state **(Map 4)**, it was not centralized like its counterparts, as the nobility who held significant power did not recognize the authority of the central governance from Krakow. The Ruthenian Orthodox nobility was pressured to convert to Catholicism and Polish culture, causing them to lose their religious and cultural autonomy. "Stripped of much of their cultural and economic elite, the Ruthenians became a 'leaderless people,' a 'non-historic nation.' 'Ruthenian' became synonymous with "peasant" (Kubicek 40).

Map 4: The Commonwealth

> "Wholesale conversion of all Ruthenians to Catholicism was both politically and practically impossible. Faced with the prospect, however, that the Orthodox Ruthenians, who constituted upwards of a quarter of the commonwealth's population, might harbor loyalty toward their Orthodox brethren in Moscow and become a source of political instability, the Polish nobles offered a compromise solution: a new church that would preserve the Orthodox rites and liturgy but pledge its loyalty to the Pope" (Kubicek 40-41).

Some Orthodox leaders saw this as an opportunity for integration and revival of the Orthodox faith, while others saw it as a betrayal. This act faced with significant backlash with the reversion to Orthodoxy by bishops and armed rebellion by Orthodox followers and Cossacks. The Polish crown deemed people who rejected the new church as disunites.

> "Brotherhood societies, which were attached to churches in many cities, played a key part in preserving Orthodox culture through educational activities and publishing. Their work helped produce a cohort of young teachers who were more willing to defend their own religious traditions and less likely to succumb to the temptation of converting to Catholicism. The brotherhoods also helped lay the groundwork for the ecclesiastical and educational reforms of Petro Mohyla. (…) Mohyla became metropolitan of Kyiv and launched a series of reforms: standardization and updating of the Orthodox liturgy; imposition of obligations of pastoral care on a previously passive and corrupt clergy; and modernization of education that included borrowing from the Catholic Jesuit model and the study of Latin. (…) in retrospect his project is understood as one to create or reanimate distinct Ruthenian or Ukrainian traditions, thereby giving Ukrainians their own sense of religious identity, separate from both Rome and Moscow (Kubicek 41-42).

3. The Cossacks

The Cossacks emerged along the lower Dnipro River. They had different backgrounds varying from criminals, runaway serfs, criminals and religious refugees, and lived beyond the reach of any government authority. They used the fertile and remote lands for agriculture and fishing, and as a base for raids against Tatars and Turks. They formed autonomous communities, or *sichs*, with the main *Sich* located in Zaporizhzhia by the 1550s, featuring a self-governing assembly called a *rada* and elected leaders known as *hetmans*. "Cossacks are celebrated today as Ukrainian freedom fighters, acquiring a mythic status equivalent to that of the American cowboy. Mikhailo Hrushevsky noted that their actions

provided the 'initiative for a strong national movement' and that their courage in attacking the menacing Tatars 'gave new hope to the downtrodden Ukrainian people.' Their democratic traditions are also positively contrasted with the hereditary, more autocratic style of rule that developed in Russia under the tsars" (Kubicek 43). Cossacks cannot be compared to the modern Ukrainians directly as they were from different ethnicities, and not all Ukrainians were Cossacks. They are defined by their democratic and rebellious nature, yet lacked the characteristics of a modern nation state.

As much as the Polish wanted to see the Cossacks as a branch of the army, the Cossacks organized significant rebellions. "These uprisings, portrayed by some as an effort to promote 'Ukrainian' rights, were spurred by several, at times inconsistent, reasons: Polish hostility to Orthodoxy and the Cossacks' perception that they were the true defenders of Orthodoxy; the desire of the Cossacks to achieve the rights of the Polish gentry; disputes over ownership of land; inconsistent treatment of the Cossacks by the Poles, who, in peacetime, often failed to make good on their wartime promises; and desire for more political autonomy" (Kubicek 44). In 1648 under the leadership of a Ruthenian noble, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, marched against the Polish forces, achieving great succes.

Map 5: The Cossack Hetmanate in 1650

"The Orthodox Church sought to turn Khmelnytsky's rebellion into a holy Crusade, with Sylvestr Kotiv, Mohyla's successor as metropolitan of Kyiv, declaring Khmelnytsky 'the new Moses' and 'gift from God'. (…) By 1649, Khmelytsky had taken control of most of central Ukraine, which was dubbed 'the Hetmanate,' (**Map 5**) with Kyiv as its capital. Whereas many in Ukraine today refer to 1648 as a war of national liberation, it is significant that many Ruthenian nobles—both those who were Polonized and others who remained Orthodox—fought against Khmelnytsky. (…) Moreover, there were significant divisions among the Cossacks themselves, especially over the question of whether or not serfdom should be abolished. The Cossack elite, like the Poles, increasingly justified their position by claiming descent from the Sarmatians (as the Poles had also done), making them more of a class than a representative of all of the incipient Ukrainian nation. As a price for Tatar support during his campaigns, Khmelnytsky allowed the Tatars to march whole villages of Ruthenians/Ukrainians to Crimean slave markets for auction" (Kubicek 45).

In 1694 during a determining battle, Khmelnytsky's Tatar allies withdrew, forcing him to negotiate a settlement with the Polish. In 1651 conflicts resumed with a major battle near Berestechko, which led the defeat of Cossack forces, as their Crimean partners defected. Khmelnytsky signed another peace deal with the Poles, yet continued the war and achieved a significant victory in the Battle of Batih in 1652. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Cossack Hetmanate was not capable of making decisive progress against the Polish.

"At this point, Khmelnytsky turned to a new source of outside support: Moscow. Russia had clear interests in Ukrainian lands: a desire to expand its own influence to the west, weaken its rival Poland, and defend the rights of the Orthodox population. In January 1654, at Pereiaslav, a small settlement near Kyiv, Khmelnytsky agreed to accept the Russian tsar's overlordship of much of what is today Ukraine. Khmelnytsky had hoped that the Russians would commit to confirm the rights of the Cossacks on their lands, but they refused to do so. Instead, Khmelnytsky made a unilateral oath of obedience to the tsar, who

now became 'autocrat of all Great and Little Russia [Ukraine].' The Treaty of Pereiaslav is one of the most significant events in both Ukrainian and Russian history. Thanks to its provisions, Russia, previously isolated to the farthest reaches of Europe, took a major step toward becoming a great power, soon becoming the dominant force in eastern Europe" (Kubicek 46).

Following the treaty, Russia invaded Polish lands, followed by a Swedish intervention that seized Warsaw in 1655. The Swedish, Cossacks and Transylvanian Kingdom launched a joint-campaign against Poland. Yet, Sweeds attacked to the Russians as well, which forced Rusians to conclude a peace with Poland in 1656, without consulting the Cossacks, therefore rising the tensions. The joint-campaign forces were defeated—following this event, Khmelnytsky faced with mutiny and died in 1657. The war continued for another 30-years after his death, known as "the Ruin" period. Succeeding him, hetman Ivan Vyhovsky was concerned over Russia's growing force and sought to have a deal with the Polish. The Treaty of Hadiach was signed in 1658, granting Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav status of becoming an equal partner in the Commonwealth, as separate principality, with great amounts of autonomy.

However, the treaty was never enforced as Russians invaded Ukraine. As Kubicek states, "had this treaty been implemented, most Ukrainian lands would have been free from Russian influence, and Ukraine could have evolved into an independent state. Indeed, its terms did more to provide self-government on Ukrainian lands than any previous arrangement under Polish or Lithuanian rule" (47). Vyhovsky successfully defeated the Russian forces, yet, he faced with a revolt, resigned and went to Poland in 1659. Khmelnytsky's 18-year-old son Yurii was elected the new hetman and was forced by "the Russians into signing a new treaty that gave the Russians control over Cossack foreign relations and the right to station troops in all major

Map 6: The Treaty of Andrusovo

Hetmanate cities. Fighting between Poland and Russia over Ukrainian lands broke out in 1660. Ukraine was divided, a status that was affirmed by the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, by which Russia received the Left Bank (eastern Ukraine) and Poland retained control over the Right Bank (western Ukraine)" (Kubicek 47). Russians were supoosed to give Kyiv back to Polan in 1669, yet they did not. "Fighting among Poles, Russians, Cossacks, and Tatars continued across Ukrainian lands until 1686, when the so-called Eternal Peace between Poland and Russia essentially affirmed the division of the Treaty of Andrusovo (**Map 6**) and, in a great humiliation to the Poles, gave the Russians the right to intervene to protect the Orthodox faithful who still resided in the commonwealth. The net effect of Khmelnytsky's rebellion, ostensibly designed to promote Ukrainian autonomy and unity, ended up dividing Ukraine in two and delivering part of it to Russia" (Kubicek 48).

4. Ukraine Under the Russian Empire

In the late 1600s, as a result of the Treaty of Andrusovo, the Cossack Hetmanate was left with one third of the territories it once controlled (**Map 7**). The residents of Hetmanate were mostly poor peasants, effected by wars and high taxation by the land-owning elite, the *starshyna*. "Tensions between the starshyna and the "rabble" (chern) were exploited on multiple occasions by Russian authorities (…). In 1692, a disgruntled official from the Hetmanate fled to the Zaporizhian Sich and organized a revolt against the 'bloodsucking' starshyna in order to 'tear away our fatherland Ukraine from Muscovite rule.' The Tatars, employed on behalf of the rebellion, turned on the Cossack population instead, however, and this revolt petered out" (Kubicek 52-53).

Map 7: Russian Expansion into Ukrainian Lands

In 1687, with support from the Russian, Ivan Mazepa was elected as the hetman. Mazepa in his 20-year-rule gained the trust of Tsar Peter I, became a close advisor to him, maintaining close ties with the Russians—Russian officials declaring "'There has never been a hetman so helpful and beneficial to the tsar as Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa'" (Kubicek 54). During a Cossack revolt in 1703, in the Polish controlled Ukraine, Mazepa got approval from Peter I to send his forces to occupy the Right Bank—effectively uniting the Ukrainian lands by doing so. The ties began to break with the start of the Great Northern War, as Cossacks were sent to fight in the northern front. In 1705 Peter I decided to appoint Russian and German commanders to the Cossacks which created a blow in the morale. In 1708 Peter I refused to defend the Ukrainian lands from Sweden's Polish allies, as per the Treaty of Pereiaslav. In 1709 with Charles XII of Sweden focusing his forces to Ukraine instead of Moscow, forced Mazepa to an agreement—in which Charles XII agreed to protect Ukraine and free it from Russian control. "Peter labeled Mazepa the 'new Judas.' His commanders attacked the Hetmanate's capital at Baturyn and massacred its inhabitants. A Russian reign of terror descended on Ukrainian lands" (Kubicek 55). Russians destroyed the Zaporizhian Sich, and defeated the Swedish and Cossacks in the Battle of Poltava. After Mazepa's failure and death, the Hetmanate was devoured by the Russian war machine. "In 1722, the tsar set up a Little Russian Collegium, made up of Russian officers based in Ukraine, to share power with the hetman. (…) In 1721, Peter subordinated the Orthodox Church to the state and abolished the Kyiv Patriarchate. (…) From 1734 to 1750, Russia set up a new body, the Governing Council of the Hetman's Office, a committee headed by a Russian prince, to rule in lieu of elections for a single hetman" (Kubicek 55). In 1785, during the reign of Catherine II, Hemanate was completely abolished. "'These provinces,' she declared, 'should be Russified… That task will be easy if wise men are chosen as governors. When the hetmans are gone from Little Russia, every effort should be made to eradicate them and their age from memory.' The Cossack elite were offered a carrot and stick: manifestations of the 'disease of self-willfulness and independence' would be punished, but those loyal to the Russian state would be eligible for posts in the Russian imperial government and enjoy the same rights as the Russian nobility" (Kubicek 56).

From 1768 to 1775 Zaporizhian Cossacks served in the army of the Catherine II, against Ottomans and Tatars. However, with the defeat of these rivals, in 1775 Russian forces destroyed the Zaporizhian Sich and sent the Cossack leadership to exile in Siberia—while most of the Cossack forces were still stationed in the front. Russians effectively seized Southern Ukraine as a result. With the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774, Ottomans retreated from Crimea and transferred the patronage of the Tatars to the Russians. In 1783, Crimea was completely absorbed by the Russian Empire. Throughout and especially at late 1700s, Russian settled to the Black Sea coast, naming these lands as the "New Russia". This era saw a significant rise in numbers of trade ports and cities in the region, most of them in the sites of old Greek and Turkish settlements. "Landowners, mainly ethnic Russians who once produced for domestic consumption, now took advantage of Ukraine's rich 'black earth' soil and began producing for international markets. Ukraine, once a frontier land, was on its way to becoming a granary not only for Russia but for the rest of Europe as well" (Kubicek 58). With Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary invading Poland in 1772, 1775, and 1795 to partition it, Russians managed to seize control of the Right Bank of Ukraine **(Map 8)**.

"Russian rule on Ukrainian lands was, for most Ukrainians, repressive. Whatever limited democratic institutions Ukrainians might have enjoyed under Cossack or Polish–Lithuanian rule were destroyed, replaced by an autocratic government in which there was no constitution, no political rights, no elected assembly, and no separation of powers. The Russian tsar was the supreme authority, both dominating secular governmental institutions and exercising control over the Russian Orthodox Church. Local courts were controlled by the landlords, and the police—both regular forces and, after 1826, a secret police—were harsh. Military conscription, introduced in Ukraine in 1797, entailed a commitment of 25 years, which, given Russia's frequent military campaigns and the harsh conditions within the Russian military, often meant a death sentence. Most Ukrainians (this term would gain currency only later, as the Russian authorities preferred to call them 'Little Russians') were enserfed peasants, tied to the land and to the labor demands imposed on them by landlords. Whereas many landlords grew rich on the grain trade, most peasants lived in squalid conditions. Illiteracy rates were high; health provisions were minimal.

Russian rule, however, also had an important cultural component. Because the "Little Russians" were linguistically and culturally similar to the 'Great Russians,' the government viewed Ukraine as essentially Russian land, although Russia did not take advantage of temporary occupation of parts of eastern Galicia during the Napoleonic Wars to try to unify all the 'Little Russians' into the empire. A medal struck in 1793 in honor of Catherine II read, 'I have recovered what was torn away,' an indication that Ukrainian lands—from the Right Bank to Crimea—were deemed as historically 'Russian,' even though they had never been ruled by Moscow. Rather, such an attitude was a clear indication that Russia was appropriating the patrimony of Kyivan Rus; and, to the extent that the population on these now Russian lands spoke a language different from proper Russian, were not Orthodox, or, heaven forbid, conceived of themselves as something other than Russian, they would have to be 'Russified' (Kubicek 59-60).

MAP 18–1 EXPANSION OF RUSSIA, 1689–1796 *The overriding territorial aim of Peter the Great in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, and of Catherine the Great in the latter half, was to secure year-round navigable outlets to the sea for the vast Russian Empire—hence Peter's push to the Baltic Sea and Catherine's to the Black Sea. Catherine also managed to acquire large areas of Poland through the partitions of that country.*

Map 8: Russian Expansion

4.1. Politics in the Late Russian Empire

The late 19th century of the Russian Empire was characterized by late economic industrialization, poverty in the rural areas and a harsh political autocracy—which caused people to demand and call for social and political reforms. "By the 1880s, the emergence of both a cultural intelligentsia and a small working class created groups that had much more potential for political organization than poorly educated, physically dispersed peasants" (Kubicek 67). However, during this period no group had enough power to challenge the Tsar's authority. Nevertheless, various groups developed their own solutions for economic and political issues, mainly centred around Marxist and socialist thoughts. "Among Ukrainians, the most prominent socialist voice belonged to Mykhailo Drahomanov, a former professor at Kyiv University (…). From 1876 to 1882, he published Ukraine's first political journal, *Hromada*. Although he embraced the socialists' focus on class conflict, he also saw Ukraine's problem as a national one, as its peasant base was exploited by the Russian upper classes. He saw socialism, even anarchism, as a solution to Ukraine's problems, advocating the transformation of Ukrainian lands in both Russia and Austria-Hungary into self-governing communes" (Kubicek 67). In 1891 some young activists and students established a Brotherhood for the liberation of all of the Russian peoples, yet it was shut down in 1893.

"The Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (1898) was Russia's first party, and it included a more radical Marxist faction led by Vladimir I. Lenin. In 1903, this party would split, with Lenin's faction called the Bolsheviks, derived from *bolshinstvo*, the Russian word for majority. Both factions of the Social Democratic Workers Party, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks (taken from *menshinstvo*, the word for minority), courted support among industrial workers, including those in eastern Ukraine. As noted, however, most of these workers were not ethnically Ukrainian, and they did not embrace a separate Ukrainian agenda.

The first Ukrainian political party in the Russian Empire was the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), founded in Kharkiv in 1900. Like Drahomanov, it attempted to fuse the ideas of socialism and nationalism, producing, as argued by one historian, young men who had Marx's Communist Manifesto in one pocket and Shevchenko's poems in the other. One of its founders was Mykola Mikhnovsky, whose pamphlet Independent Ukraine (1900) became a sort of manifesto for the party. Recognizing the power of nationalism and arguing that Ukraine had been illegitimately subjugated by Russia, he asserted that Ukraine faced a decisive, historical moment that required the mobilization of the population to create a 'free and independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.' This would not be easy, he acknowledged, but he had faith, that even though 'numerically we are small, but in our love of Ukraine we are strong!'

The RUP split in 1903–1904 into several factions. A more nationalistoriented Ukrainian National Party (which included Mikhnovsky) put primacy on the national question, labeling Russians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, and Romanians as enemies insofar as they dominated Ukraine. In contrast, the more socialist-oriented *Spilka* (the Union) cooperated with Russian socialist parties and criticized the nationalists as bourgeois radicals. Finally, there was a rump RUP core, which renamed itself in 1905 the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party and combined a socialist orientation with a call for Ukrainian autonomy. More moderate groupings also formed. These included the General Ukrainian Organization (1897), which originated as a cultural institution but renamed itself in 1904 as the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party (URDP). Like the socialists, it argued for a democratic transformation of the empire, but it had a more conservative orientation on social reform. It allied itself with the all-Russian Constitutional Democratic Party, popularly known as the Cadets. Overall, however, all of the Ukrainian political groupings remained small, with most members drawn from students and intellectuals, not the more numerous peasants or industrial workers" (Kubicek 67-68).

In 1905 revolutionary activities grew in Russia, forcing the Tsar's hand to establish an elected assembly and a limited constitutional regime named the *Duma*. The assembly was dismissed by the Tsar in 1906 and 1907, and had very limited power. The 1905 Revolution, however, created an environment in which Ukrainian revolutionists could re-open their educational establishments and peasant cooperatives. In order to consolidate his authority, Tsar Nicholas II arrested many Ukrainian socialist and nationalists, and in 1910 banned Ukrainian publications. In 1914 Russia participated into the First World War. "By the time of the outbreak of World War I, Ukrainian consciousness remained poorly developed. Ukrainian political and cultural expressions were repressed by tsarist Russia; much of Ukrainian society, particularly in urban centers, had been Russified; and the peasants, the vast majority of Ukrainian speakers, remained poor and largely illiterate. Focused on life in their village, most Ukrainians in the Russian Empire knew they were not Moscovites, or Poles, or Jews, but 'did not yet have a clear notion of allegiance to a broader Ukrainian nation'" (Kubicek 70).

5. Western Ukraine and the Habsburgs

"Although the vast majority of Ukrainian lands were gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire, most of western Ukraine managed to escape Russian rule. This area, which had been subjected to rule by Kyivan Rus and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, remained a part of Poland even as Left Bank Ukraine fell under Russian rule after 1654. By the end of the 1700s, however, Poland was disappearing from the map of Europe. Much of Poland,

(…) was taken over by Russia; but Polish-ruled areas of Galicia, together with the Ottoman-ruled region of Bukovyna, were incorporated into the Habsburg Empire, whose capital was Vienna. (…) Although representing only a small portion of today's Ukraine, western Ukraine's different historical experience has direct relevance for contemporary Ukraine. Because this region long avoided Russian and later Soviet rule, its residents were more prone to develop a distinct Ukrainian identity, and it became the main area for Ukrainian nationalist activity both during and after the Soviet period. Unlike eastern Ukraine, western Ukraine can also claim a stronger 'European' identity thanks to its experience under the Habsburgs, a feature that has taken on importance in the post-Soviet period.

(…) This is not to say that Ukrainian activists achieved most of their objectives. Galicia was not divided, there was no Ukrainian language university, and, despite gains, Ukrainian still did not enjoy equality with Polish in public life and education. The national consciousness of the average Ukrainian peasant was still poorly developed, and socioeconomically, Ukrainians still ranked far below German speakers, Poles, and Jews. Ukrainian nationalism did not have a mass following as did Polish or Hungarian nationalism. The larger dream of unifying all Ukrainian lands had seemed distant at best, and even Hrushevsky in 1906 wrote an article entitled 'Galicia and Ukraine,' suggesting that the divided Ukrainian territories might be fated to go their separate ways. Nonetheless, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainians such as Hrushevsky and the relatively tolerant atmosphere of the Habsburg Empire, a politically aware Ukrainian nation was emerging by the early twentieth century in western Ukraine. In 1900, it was illegal in Kyiv to publish a book in Ukrainian; but in Lviv one found Ukrainian schools, learned societies, newspapers, cooperatives, and political parties" (Kubicek 73-82).

6. The Revolution and World War I

In 8 March 1917, street demonstration took place in St. Petersburg against the tsar, led by food shortages, resentment towards the war and Tsar's authority. Soldiers in the city sided with the crowd, and Tsar had to abdicate the throne. While the liberal members of the Duma established a Provisional Government, radical socialist members, workers, soldiers and intellectuals established the Petrograd Soviet. Soviets ("councils" in Russian) was created in other cities like Kharkiv and Kyiv as well. The struggle for power between Provisional Governments and soviets—combined with other economic troubles caused Russia's effort and success in WWI to decline.

"In Ukraine, one could say that there was 'triple power,' meaning that the all-Russian Provisional Government and the various soviets competed for power with Ukrainian nationalists. On March 17, 1917, only two days after the abdication of the tsar and a day after the formation of a soviet in Kyiv, Ukrainian activists from the Society of Ukrainian Progressives set up their own institution, the Central Rada ('council' in Ukrainian). Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the well-known historian, returned from exile in Moscow and was chosen as its chairman. All of the main Ukrainian political parties, which were now free to engage in political activities openly, sent representatives to the Central Rada.

The collapse of tsarist authority led to a revival of Ukrainian political and cultural life. Within the Central Rada, parties voiced a variety of positions. The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists was the most moderate, calling for more Ukrainian autonomy within a Russian state and rejecting demands for seizing large landholdings. (…). On April 1, an estimated 100,000 people marched in Kyiv under Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flags for Ukrainian autonomy. A week later, the Central Rada declared that the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, scheduled to convene the next January, should affirm Ukrainian autonomy. In the summer, when the Provisional Government allowed the creation of national military units, 300,000 soldiers from the old Russian army swore allegiance to the Central Rada, which, in addition to calling for more Ukrainian rights, tried to appeal to the masses with slogans of land reform and the end to the war.

The Central Rada, however, was not an elected body. Initially, its membership was small, composed mostly of teachers, clergy, students, and representatives from Ukrainian cultural societies. It was, in other words, hardly representative of Ukrainian society. It did, however, attempt to expand its base, organizing an All-Ukrainian National Congress from April 17 to 21, which attracted 1,500 participants. The Congress adopted a resolution declaring that only national–territorial autonomy would meet the political, economic, and cultural needs of the people residing in Ukraine; however, this was not a statement in favor of independence. Rather, the Congress asserted that Ukraine should henceforth constitute a component part of a reformed, federal Russia. Throughout the spring of 1917, the Central Rada helped organize other congresses, which also affirmed the need for an autonomous Ukraine and protection of the Ukrainian language. By summer, an expanded Central Rada included more than 600 representatives and functioned as the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine. It met at the Pedagogical Museum in Kyiv, under a portrait of Shevchenko and a Ukrainian flag emblazoned with the slogan, 'Long live autonomous Ukraine in a federated Russia.'

The Central Rada's appeals for greater Ukrainian autonomy were rejected, however, by the Provisional Government in Petrograd, which, among other objections, noted that the Rada was an unelected body and therefore could not claim to represent the will of the population of Ukraine. In response, the Central Rada issued its First Universal (the name used by Cossack hetmans for their decrees) on June 23, 1917, and declared Ukrainian autonomy unilaterally. The Universal declared:

'Let Ukraine be free. Without separating themselves entirely from Russia, without severing connections with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian people in their own land have the right to order their own lives. Let law and order in Ukraine be given by the all-national Ukrainian Parliament elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage… From this day forth we shall direct our own lives'" (Kubicek 90-92).

The Central Rada had little authority in Ukraine, however, and was mostly dependent on voluntary tax funding. Yet, it founded a government cabinet called the General Secretariat, led by a socialist named Vynnychenko. The Provisional Government did not acknowledge the Central Rada's authority, yet it recognized the General Secretariat in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Podolia, and Volhynia. "Ukrainian parties fared particularly poorly in Russified eastern Ukraine, which, with its relatively large working class, gravitated more toward Marxist-oriented parties. In Kyiv, where Ukrainian parties controlled fewer than 20% of the municipal council's seats, anti-Ukrainian groups such as the Gogol League of Little Russians and the Russian National Union actively opposed introduction of the Ukrainian language into the schools" (Kubicek 92). The General Secretariat failed to implement land-reforms, which was the peasants' main interest, as they were not concerned with high politics, creating unrest in the rural. Socialists and Vynnychenko was unable to create a standing army or functioning bureaucracy as well. Various groups competing for power created a power vacuum in Ukraine.

In October 25 of 1917, the Bolshevik Party, led by Vladimir Lenin, seized power in Petrograd—the Central Rada in Ukraine supported the Bolsheviks in Kyiv against the Provisional Government forces. The Central Rada published its Third Universal, declared its authority over all of Ukraine and announced the establishment of Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). Bolsheviks did not recognize the independence of Ukraine and they organized an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets that tried to overthrow the Central Rada but failed—in December. Bolsheviks proclaimed the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic in Kharkiv—that is loyal to the Lenin's government in Russia. Bolshevik rebellions broke out amongst workers in Kyiv—Russian and Ukrainian Bolshevik forces marched on Kyiv, and seized it in February of 1918. The Central Rada fled to Zhitomir. Yet, since 1917 the Central Rada was secretly in contact with the Germans for establishing a peace treaty, and Germans were willing to do so as having small independent states in the Eastern border was more preferable.

"Because only a fully independent state could conclude an international treaty, however, on January 25, 1918, the Central Rada issued its Fourth Universal, which condemned the Bolsheviks for spreading 'anarchy, murder, and crime' in Ukraine and officially

proclaimed that the UPR was 'independent, dependent upon no one, a free sovereign state of the Ukrainian people.' On February 9, 1918, the UPR signed a peace treaty with the Germans and Austrians. This treaty recognized the UPR's authority over Ukraine's nine provinces. Secret protocols to the peace treaty, however, stipulated that Ukraine would deliver food to the German and Austrian armies. Repaying what the German negotiator called the Ukrainians' 'practical attitude,' the Germans compelled the Bolshevik-dominated government of Russia, which was engaged in its own peace talks, to recognize the UPR, withdraw from Ukrainian territory, and cease efforts to establish a Soviet Ukrainian government. The Bolsheviks, who had presided over executions of thousands of 'class enemies' in Kyiv and elsewhere, withdrew from Ukrainian territory by April 1918. Many of their leaders fled to Russia, where they created the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine" (Kubicek 94).

The German troops were to stay as long as they are needed for the liberation of Ukraine, however the UPR—which still followed socialist ideologies, was weak and not able to enforce laws or authority. For the Germans, it was a resource of grain, and they took control of the railways and other lands owned by the UPR. Germans decided to put Pavlo Skoropadsky in power, a Russian-speaking Tsarist general, to create a Ukrainian monarchy. "On April 29, 1918, the conservative Congress of Ukrainian Landowners proclaimed Skoropadsky Hetman of Ukraine, thereby reanimating the old Cossack title" (Kubicek 95). He came to power with little to no resistance against him as the UPR was weak. "Although he was not an ethnic Ukrainian nationalist, he was, in his own way, a Ukrainian nation and state-builder, one who 'strove to introduce a new concept of the Ukrainian nation that was founded not on knowledge of the Ukrainian language, but on loyalty to the Ukrainian state'" (Kubicek 95). The pressure put on by Germans for grain caused rebellions and peasant uprisings in the countryside, causing his reign to be a short one.

"Political opposition consolidated in the Ukrainian National Union, which elected Vynnychenko as its leader. By the fall of 1918, German defeat in World War I seemed imminent, and Skoropadsky's various measures to preserve his power—including negotiations with the Ukrainian National Union and, later, appointment of a pro-Russian cabinet to appease the Western powers who favored a non-Bolshevik Russia—failed. Vynnychenko and Petliura organized a committee, called the Directory after the French revolutionary government of 1795–1799, to overthrow the Hetmanate. Thousands of peasants volunteered to fight for the Directory, and many of the Hetmanate's units defected, sensing that the tide had turned. On December 14, 1918, the Germans left Kyiv (…).

Toward the end of 1918, however, as the Habsburgs faced final defeat in World War I, the authorities offered concessions to the empire's various minority groups, pledging, for example, in October 1918, to create a free federation of peoples. On October 18, Ukrainian deputies of both the imperial and provincial parliaments, together with representatives of major political parties, established the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv. On November 1, with the end of the war only days away, the Ukrainian National Council declared the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, which was named the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR).

The WUPR, however, was opposed by Poland, which had its own territorial and national aspirations. Poles claimed all of Galicia, and they were the largest group in the major cities, including Lviv. Street fighting between Poles and Ukrainians broke out in November, and on November 22, the Poles forced the nascent Western Ukrainian government out of Lviv. This conflict turned into a full-fledged Ukrainian–Polish war, which later turned into a Soviet–Polish war. At roughly the same time, the Ukrainian-populated regions of Bukovyna and Transcarpathia were transferred to an enlarged Romanian state and a new country, Czechoslovakia, respectively. This arrangement was confirmed by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The WUPR, however, did not simply disappear. Thanks in large measure to a relatively liberal political environment under the Austrians, Ukrainian civil society was well organized and unified in the struggle against the Poles, its longtime rival.

The WUPR had its own national army, the Ukrainian Galician Army. It included former German and Austrian officers, and, interestingly, its two commanders in chief were former Russian generals.

The WUPR also looked to the east for support, seeking to unite with the emerging Ukrainian state in former tsarist Russian lands. The Hetmanate had already collapsed, meaning that the WUPR, which, in key respects, had a more conservative orientation, had to turn to the leftistdominated Directory, which had reanimated the UPR upon disposing the Hetmanate. On January 22, 1919, the two Ukrainian states formally unified, making the WUPR the western province of the larger UPR **(Map 9)**. In fact, however, in large part due to the military situation, the western regions retained their autonomy and their laws" (Kubicek 96-97).

Map 9: Ukraine in 1918-1919

This Ukrainian state was under threat from both the Poles and the Bolsheviks at the same time. Even though in Paris Peace Talks of 1919 Ukrainian delegation tried to convince the Allies for a united Ukrainian state **(Map 10)**, the Polish managed to convince them instead for their cause, suggesting a strong Polish state that will counter and balance the power of Germans and Bolsheviks in Eastern Europe. British were more inclined towards the Ukrainians, however Americans held the decisive say on this matter, siding with the Poles—the principles of American president Woodrow Wilson, on self-determination, was not applied to the Ukrainian lands as a result. Peasant uprisings and Bolshevik rebellions continued in the WUPR, weakening the state. Treaty of Versailles gave temporary control of Galicia to Poland—Ukrainian Galician Army crossed the historical border of the Habsburgs and Russians, Zbruch River to confront Polish forces. WUPR leader sought assistance from the UPR Directory's leaders that were in retreat from their own battles against the Bolsheviks—who also saw the Polish as a natural ally in their war. The Ukrainian Galician Army fought together with the Directory forces against both Red and White armies in the Russian civil war, even taking Kyiv.

"The Ukrainian Galician Army surrendered to White forces in November. Meanwhile, Polish forces, which had made a separate peace with the Ukrainian Directory, advanced farther into western Ukraine, occupying the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia. Although fighting between Polish and Soviet forces occurred in western Ukraine in 1920 and Polish forces even reached Kyiv in May, the

Map 10: Proposed Map of Ukraine

WUPR could not be resurrected. Soviet forces eventually pushed the Polish forces back, and by the terms of the Treaty of Riga of March 1921, the Soviets recognized Polish control over Galicia and western Volhynia" (Kubicek 98).

When the Directory entered to Kyiv in 1918 and re-established the UPR, it did not re-opened the Central Rada, instead it gave absolute authority of both executive and legislative to itself, like a military junta. The Directory was struggling as a result of its lack of military force—which led peasant armies, illegitimate hetmans and anarchists to run-free in the rural. In order to assist White Russian forces, French landed near Odessa, and the Bolsheviks continued their invasion from north—forcing Vynnychenko to unsuccessfully trying to secure a deal with the Bolsheviks. In 1919, Bolsheviks entered to Kyiv. New chairman of the Directory, Petliura, tried to win the support of the Allies by creating a non-socialist cabinet, yet failed as the Allies continued to favour the White Russians. "By April 1919, at about the same time that Polish forces were moving in from the west and pushing the Ukrainian Galician Army to the east, the Directory was in full retreat to the west, losing control over most Ukrainian lands to Bolshevik and White forces. Hrushevsky, among others, advocated negotiations with the Bolsheviks to preserve some type of Ukrainian autonomy. Petliura, who retains a reputation as a bandit among Russians to this day, refused this course" (Kubicek 99). Bolsheviks established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic to rule for the Red Army—making the official language Russian.

In the country side Bolsheviks collected the grain using the army, and forced peasants to work in collective farms controlled by the state, whereas in the urban areas the secret police called "Cheka" worked on espionage to eliminate the enemies of the regime. Peasants therefore revolted against the Bolshevik rule, often together with the Ukrainian nationalists. "The Bolsheviks, however, could not maintain control over Kyiv. By August, a combination of White forces from the south and Petliura, assisted by the Ukrainian Galician Army, from the west, occupied Kyiv. The Whites, intent on reestablishing a unified Russia, had no intention of recognizing a separate Ukrainian state. They ordered the Galician forces, which they viewed as foreigners, to withdraw. They did so, and the Whites tried to undo the actions of the Bolsheviks by imposing aspects of the prerevolutionary social order on lands under their control" (Kubicek 100). The Directory declared war on the White Russians as well, however with the surrender of the Ukrainian Galician Army to the White Army—while Petliura was trying to resist against the White Army forces, signed a deal with the Poles, completely dividing the West and East Ukrainian forces.

The Directory was disintegrated with Polish forces' advancement. In December 1919, defeating the White Russian forces, Bolsheviks took Kyiv once again. "Learning from past mistakes, this time they were not so harsh: Lenin agreed to policies that would recognize the Ukrainian language and be less forceful visà-vis the peasantry, granting them individual allotments of land. Ukrainian Bolsheviks also formed an alliance with a splinter group from the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party, giving the Bolshevikrun government more of a 'Ukrainian face.' The Bolsheviks managed to establish control over eastern Ukraine, although the Whites, diminished as a military force, managed to hold out in Crimea until November 1920" (Kubicek 101). Petliura, who fled to Warsaw, was ambitious and approached to the Poles for their support for a campaign against the Bolsheviks. "The anti-Russian Poles happily used Petliura, hoping to create a buffer state between them and communist Russia. Polish and Ukrainian forces retook Kyiv in May 1920, and the last incarnation of the UPR was established there" (Kubicek 101). The Russian Red Army, pushed the Ukrainian and Poles back and forced them to retreat as far as Warsaw. With the peace treaty signed between the Polish and Bolsheviks, Poland gained Galicia and western Volhynia and recognized the Bolshevik sovereignty.

6.1. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine

"Under the Russian tsars, Ukrainian lands had been divided into nine different provinces. There was no entity known as 'Ukraine.' Like the Germans in 1918, the Bolsheviks now had to recognize that there was something called Ukraine. Thus in 1919, they proclaimed the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which was technically an independent state, managing to win diplomatic recognition from several European states. True, this republic was ruled by the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was a branch of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, and its authority was established and preserved thanks to

the efforts of the Red Army. It was not, in other words, a purely, or even mostly, Ukrainian creation. However, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin recognized that Russification was no longer the answer and acknowledged that the Ukrainian republic would have to have some Ukrainian content" (Kubicek 102).

7. Ukraine Under the Soviet Rule

In 1929 Stalin came to power in the Soviets, starting the industrialization process. From 1928 to 1932, Stalin made great investments into to vast resources of Ukraine. With the industrialization movements, "ethnic Ukrainians became a majority both of the republic's industrial workforce and, for the first time, of all urban residents" (Kubicek 115). The capital was largely obtained from the grain trade, which the state takeover from the peasants—this government enforced policy of forceful seize of grain caused the event known as the Great Famine of Ukraine, with death of an estimated five million people. The peasants were forced to work for collective state farms, which they resisted and was seen as class enemies, that were eradicated by Stalin. At the same time, suppressing the Ukrainian nationalism the intellectuals led with the peasants being the base. "One of the aims of collectivization (and, by extension, the famine itself) was 'the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism's social base—the individual land-holdings.' (…) A government decree in August 1932 declared all collective farm property—including animals and agriculture produce—as state property and mandated harsh punishments for those who would requisition it for their own use. Party officials, often aided by the military, sent out teams to the countryside to acquire grain from the peasants" (Kubicek 115-116).

> "In 1933, top Ukrainian party officials were arrested for allegedly participating in Ukrainian military organizations that were supposedly financed by Polish landlords and German fascists. (...) Throughout 1933–1934, all leading Ukrainian cultural institutions—the Academy of Sciences, theaters, media, scientific institutes—were purged of allegedly anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary elements. Thousands were sent to harsh labor camps, where they perished. The general policy of Ukrainianization of the 1920s was reversed. Russian was promoted as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian-language publishing declined" (Kubicek 118).

In 1939, Second World War started, following with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—the Nazis and Soviets agreed to divide Poland. "The Soviets moved quickly to consolidate their authority in western Ukraine. They portrayed the invasion as the reunification of Ukraine. A pro-Soviet 'Ukrainian National Congress,' elected under dubious circumstances immediately after the invasion, convened in late October and asked that western Ukraine be admitted to the Uk SSR, a request that was approved by the latter's parliament on November 15" (Kubicek 120). To consolidate their power in the western Ukraine after the invasion of Poland, Soviets arrested non-communist party leaders and sent administrators from Moscow—deporting many people to Siberia and Central Asia. However, in Galicia, Soviets applied softer policies. "Cultural and educational exchanges were promoted between western and eastern Ukraine, although by 1940, it became clear to the authorities that west Ukrainians were not enamored with what they saw in Soviet Ukraine, and those from eastern Ukraine risked being contaminated with the virus of bourgeois nationalism" (Kubicek 120-121). Nationalist Ukrainian movements continued their existence under secrecy during this period, mainly via the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Many members of the OUN was sympathetic towards the Nazis, and a more radical and armed faction that split from it, OUN-B, continued its existence under German occupied Poland. In 1941, Nazis trained these Ukrainians, to fight against the Soviets.

In 1941, Hitler started the invasion of the Soviets—many in western Ukraine welcomed the German forces that moved together with OUN-B. "In Lviv on June 30, 1941, they declared the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state. In their declaration, the OUN-B called on all Ukrainians to join in the fight against 'Moscovite occupation' and to press forward to seize Kyiv, which would be the capital of independent Ukraine" (Kubicek 121). The members of the OUN-B moved farther inland Ukraine to establish separate Ukrainian administrations. The Germans were tolerant of OUN-B and its counterpart OUN-M, yet arrested their leaders, fearing from the creation of a separate Ukrainian state. "Whereas some German officers argued that allowing non-Russians a measure of self-government would help win the Germans civilian support, Nazi racial ideology held that the Ukrainians, like other Slavs, were

Untermenschen ('subhuman'). Hitler made the German position clear in September 1941, declaring that Germany had no interest in a free Ukraine." (Kubicek 122). During the German occupation and atmosphere of repression, Nazis found many collaborators that were willing to share information on Jews and Communists—for their arrest and possible execution.

> "There was determined resistance to German rule. Some of this was by Soviet partisans who operated in Ukraine behind German lines. Some estimate that as many as 200,000 pro-Soviet insurgents or guerrilla fighters—most of whom were ethnically Ukrainian—attacked German supply and communication lines during the occupation. In 1942, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a small group organized initially to fight against the Soviets, began attacking the Germans. Both the OUN-B and OUN-M established military units to fight the Germans as well. In 1943, these various groups came together under the banner of the UPA, a 40,000-person force, which, at various times from 1942 to 1945, fought Germans, Soviet partisans, regular Soviet Red Army troops, and Polish guerrilla forces" (Kubicek 123).

Starting from 1943, German forces retreated from the Eastern Front, and in 1944 the Soviets declared the liberation of the Ukrainian lands, with the costs and consequences of war. At the end of the war, Stalin decided to unite all of the Ukrainian lands under the Soviet rule. Thus, initiated a population transfer between Poland and Ukraine. There have been made no significant change in the Soviet model. With Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev came to power. "Khrushchev's rule brought some positives for Ukraine. Because he considered Ukraine his power base, he promoted several officials from Ukraine into the all-Soviet leadership in Moscow. For the first time since the 1920s, ethnic Ukrainians were also picked to head the republic- level CPU, and ethnic Ukrainians dominated the high ranks of the CPU hierarchy. The economy was decentralized, giving Ukrainian ministries more control over Ukrainian economic enterprises (Kubicek 126). He released many political prisoners, including some of the UPA fighters.

> "Although some of these reforms would later be reversed by Khrushchev's successors, one measure literally changed the map of Ukraine. In 1954, to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, Crimea was transferred from the Russian Republic to the Uk SSR (**Map 11**), even though most of the population of Crimea were ethnic Russians who had moved to the area after the Tatars had been deported. Under Soviet rule, this territorial adjustment had little import, but in 1991, when Ukraine became independent, Crimea, despite its demographic makeup, historical connection to Russia, and the presence of important Soviet military bases, became part of an independent Ukrainian state" (Kubicek 127).

Map 11: Territorial Expansion of Ukraine

In 1964, Brezhnev came to power—who similarly started and developed his political carrier in Ukraine. "Brezhnev found himself in conflict with Petro Shelest, an ethnic Ukrainian who became leader of the CPU in 1963. Although Shelest supported the ouster of Khrushchev, he clashed with Brezhnev and the leadership in Moscow because he was a strong advocate of Ukraine's economy and culture. (…) for him, 'Soviet Ukraine meant a strong Ukraine with a fully developed economy and national culture.'" (Kubicek 127-128).

> "Most Ukrainians, like most Soviet citizens, were not willing to risk anti-government political activity. Although Khrushchev's promise to overtake the United States in terms of living standards went unrealized, people could expect a steady job and provision of basic

goods. More and more people enrolled in higher education. By the late 1970s, for the first time, most of the population of Ukraine lived in cities. Many Ukrainians, particularly those living eastern and southern Ukraine, spoke primarily Russian and were attracted in some ways to and indoctrinated in other ways into the idea of a greater Soviet/Russian culture. As noted, however, the Soviets made fewer inroads into western Ukraine, where Ukrainian language schools predominated and the pre-Soviet period was within popular memory. Ukraine, as a political unit, was thus united under Soviet rule. Identity—Soviet, Russian, Ukrainian, or some sort of mix—remained split and increasingly regionalized, a phenomenon that would manifest itself both during the push for Ukrainian independence and in post-Soviet Ukraine" (Kubicek 129-130).

8. Ukrainian Independence Movements in the Soviets

In 1985 Gorbachev came to power, and he implemented three main reform movements: *glasnost* or openness, *perestroika* or economic restructuring, and *demokratizatsiia* or democratization.

"Gorbachev's glasnost, which encouraged more open discussions of Stalin's crimes and allowed people to voice complaints against Soviet authorities, gave impetus to Baltic peoples who felt they were captive nations that had been illegally annexed by Moscow. They not only wanted a hearing to air their grievances, but they also wanted to rectify the situation. Initially, demands centered on preserving local languages and other aspects of their culture. Eventually, these grew into calls for sovereignty within the USSR and then, finally, complete independence. Perestroika played into this because the Baltic republics, ranking as some of the richest in the Soviet Union, believed that economic decentralization would be advantageous for them. Many therefore pushed for more economic autonomy. Finally, demokratizatsiia provided a means for nationalist groups both to organize and contend for power—they won 1990 republican-level elections in all three Baltic republics—and to create an incentive for local communist leaders to become more nationalist if they hoped to gain popular support. Although it started relatively slowly in 1986–1987, a wave of nationalism quickly gained strength in the Baltics, and both local elites and authorities in Moscow proved unable or unwilling to stop it. The example of the Baltics would spread elsewhere in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine" (Kubicek 135-136).

The Chernobyl disaster, besides its environmental effects, had an unexpected political impact on the people—the government was disregarding its own peoples. Right after Chernobyl, starting in 1986, nationalist movements in Ukraine gained speed with the intellectuals' and Ukrainian media's support. Various nationalist organizations were established, many allied to Gorbachev—as he was against the conservative communism. "By 1988, there were efforts to copy the successful national-democratic mobilization in the Baltic states by bringing the various Ukrainian cultural, religious, environmental, and youth organizations together in a Popular Front. (…) In February 1989, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring (known as Rukh, or 'Movement') issued its draft program" (Kubicek 140).

"The communist authorities were rightfully nervous. Popular fronts had done well in elections in the Baltic states and were pushing ahead with demands for sovereignty, and in April, Soviet troops killed nationalist protesters in Georgia. Authorities in Moscow called for stronger action against nationalists and others who were, in their view, exploiting perestroika as an excuse to violate law and order. Authorities in Kyiv were concerned about their loss of authority and legitimacy, not just because of the elections but also because many individuals were resigning from the CPU" (Kubicek 142).

Contributing to the movement created by populist fronts, worker strikes in the highly Russified region of Ukraine, Donbas in 1989, 1990 and 1991—even though they were not nationalistic in nature, and the removal of Shcherbytsky as leader of the CPU in September 1989 caused many Ukrainians to call for independence.

"Consistent with the idea of a wave of nationalism, nationalist mobilization grew throughout the Soviet Union and in Ukraine in 1990. (…) A decisive event was the March 1990 elections to the republic-level Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Forty independent groups banded together to form the Democratic Bloc, which called for Ukrainian political and economic sovereignty, a new constitution, democratization, national rebirth, and an end to nuclear power. The Democratic Bloc organized numerous campaign rallies, including some in eastern Ukraine, where disillusionment with communist rule was spreading.

(…) Ukraine had no president, Kravchuk, as head of the parliament, began to act like the head of state. In November 1990, he invited Boris Yeltsin to Kyiv, and the two leaders, acting as if the entire Gorbachev-backed Union framework was irrelevant, signed a broad-ranging treaty between their republics. Kravchuk also came out against the use of force against pro-independence groups in Lithuania, and he openly opposed Gorbachev's plans for a new Union Treaty.

On August 19, 1991, the day before a new Union Treaty was to be signed in Moscow, conservative forces in the Communist Party and security forces formed an Emergency State Committee and put Gorbachev, who was vacationing on the Black Sea, under house arrest. Yeltsin, who managed to escape capture, rallied democratic and anti-communist forces outside the Russian parliament. The coup, which was poorly organized, fell apart when the Soviet military sided with Yeltsin, who, emboldened from this victory, banned the now widely discredited Communist Party.

(…) On August 24, 1991, three days after the coup collapsed, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by a vote of 346 to 1, issued a declaration of independence. This was followed up by measures—also overwhelming approved—to assert Ukrainian control over all defense forces on Ukrainian territory and introduce a Ukrainian currency. (…) On December 1, 1991, (…) Ukrainians voted in an independence referendum and also for their first president" (Kubicek 147-152).

9. Evaluating the Historical Context

The history of Russians and Ukrainians, emerged from same roots of the Kyivan Rus, although the origin of these people are still up to debate. While the Moscovites lived independently, Ukrainians had various overlords that implemented different policies of assimilation. Ukraine under Lithuanian rule saw Orthodoxy as a unifying cultural aspect, with the conversion of their Lithuanian lieges. The Lithuanians saw the people of Rus (Ukrainians) as equivalents in terms of subjects, and granted them some level of autonomy. The Polish rule resulted with harsh persecutions religiously, that forced the conversion to Catholicism and the cultural assimilation of Ukrainians. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about a separate Ukrainian identity at this time, other than them being the local people.

The reign of the Cossacks and the Hetmanate can be seen as the continuation of the Kyivan Rus, therefore can be viewed as the second time in history Ukrainians establishing a state-like structure. The independence movements and bravery of Cossacks created a myth amongst Ukrainians that is still often referenced. "(…) the Hetmanate provided more material for the Ukrainian national idea, and a whitewashed version of freedom-loving Cossacks would be resurrected by later generations to distinguish themselves from Russians; stimulate demands for Ukrainian independence; and, later, inspire the fight against invading Russian forces in 2022" (Kubicek 57).

The division of Ukraine under the Russian Empire and the Habsburgs, proved to be another historical development that had long-lasting effects. Western Ukraine, under Habsburg enjoyed larger levels of autonomy and freedom, preserving their language and culture, whereas Eastern Ukraine faced with Russification efforts by the Tsar. This geographical division created two separate Ukrainian identities as well. During the Revolution, Ukrainians had two separate states with differing ideals and causes, proving how deep this division was. Even though the idea of a separate Ukrainian identity was shaping, it was not widely accepted or thought upon amongst the peasants.

Lenin's decision to create Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had a significant effect on creating the Ukrainian identity.

> "(…) One of Russian president Vladimir Putin's justifications for attacking Ukraine in 2022 is that Ukraine is an 'artificial creation' of Lenin, as there had not been, prior to 1919, a long-lasting, stable Ukrainian state. However, while there may not have been 'Ukraine' per se, there was, (…) development of a Ukrainian idea and a notion that Ukrainians—whatever they might have been called—were a separate people. Ukrainians could also refer to previous, non-Moscow-centered political incarnations (e.g., Cossack Hetmanates, Galician or Rus principalities) as precursors to their more modern state. Furthermore, while Ukraine is certainly a newer state, many other countries, including most in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, were, like Ukraine, carved out or pieced together from provinces of former empires. Pace Putin, no countries, however venerable their history, are 'naturally' formed; they are all created over the course of time, and most are centered on the idea of nationalism meaning they represent a particular group that identifies as a distinct people. Such is the case for Ukraine. Certainly by the early 1920s, many people felt distinctly Ukrainian, and even though Ukrainians lost a state of their own when the Soviet Union was formed in 1922, Ukraine itself did not disappear" (Kubicek 102-103).

The Ukrainians desire for independence in WWII, led some of them to collaborate with the Nazis, which is today a still debated issue.

> "It is worthwhile to reflect on the World War II experience in light of Russian president Putin's claims that Ukraine in 2022 was a 'Nazi' state, even though Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky is Jewish. Putin's assertion, while absurd to Western ears, was designed to appeal to Russian patriotic memories, as 'Nazis' are recalled more in Soviet/Russian memory as a brutal enemy responsible for the deaths of millions of Russians than as perpetrators of the Holocaust. Furthermore, his claim has some resonance as some Ukrainians during World War II did collaborate with the Nazis and fight against Russians, although to suggest that the Ukrainian government in 2022 was a 'Nazi' regime would be simply risible if not for the Russian shelling in 2022 of cities such as Kharkiv and Kyiv, which were devastated by the war, and the subsequent thousands of deaths of fraternal Ukrainians (or, in Putin's view, Russians since Ukrainian is an illegitimate identity)" (Kubicek 125).

Thus, it can be said that when looking at the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is possible to see that history and its consequences had very deep effects. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine can be seen as an identity war, when looked at the developments and past events, beyond the arguments over the Soviet's influence area.

<center>**Contemporary Developments**</center>

1. The Budapest Memorandum

A memorandum was signed by the UK, US, Russia and Ukraine in 1994 in Budapest. This memorandum assured that the signatory states will: respect the independence, the defined borders and sovereignty of Ukraine. The states recognized their obligation to refrain from use of force or any other action that will threat the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine–assuring that unless there is a case of self-defence or a legitimate reason aligning with the UN charter, their weapons will not be used against Ukraine. According to the memorandum, the signatories will refrain from using any economic coercive instruments to push their own agendas in Ukraine and from taking advantage by using sovereign rights that inherently belong to Ukraine. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, after they gained independence from the Soviet Union, negotiated with the Russian Federation and transferred their nuclear arsenal to the Russian military. Therefore, at this point, Ukraine was a non-nuclear-state. The memorandum, recognizing it as a non-nuclear-state party to the Non-proliferation Treaty, ensured that in case of Ukraine being the subject of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, the signatory states will provide assistance to it—with the condition of Ukraine remaining committed to the NPT.

2. The Charter for European Security

Under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in 1999 a document named "The Charter for European Security" was signed in Istanbul. It was aiming to establish and set the principles over security amongst the member states. Article 8 of the Charter reads: "Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards" ("Charter…").

Russia signed and ratified the Charter as well. Following this charter, when the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of the NATO started to be discussed, Russian president Putin maintained a neutral stance.

> "When NATO announced in 2002 its plan for a major (and last big) wave of expansion that would include three former Soviet republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Putin barely reacted. He certainly did not threaten to invade any of the countries to keep them out of NATO. Asked specifically in late 2001 whether he opposed the Baltic states' membership in NATO, he stated, 'We of course are not in a position to tell people what to do. We cannot forbid people to make certain choices if they want to increase the security of their nations in a particular way.' Putin even maintained the same attitude when it was a question of Ukraine someday entering the Atlantic Alliance. In May 2002, when asked for his views on the future of Ukraine's relations with NATO, Putin dispassionately replied, 'I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day, the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners'" (Person et al. 18-27).

In 2008, Georgia and Ukraine wanted to become NATO members. However, Putin warned that Russia would view NATO over-expanding to its borders as a direct threat. In NATO's 2008 Bucharest summit (in April), as some members were concerned over Russian reaction, Georgia and Ukraine's membership was refused. Secretary General of NATO, Hoop Scheffer stating that Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO someday. In response, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov stated that in the case of this happening, Russia would do everything to prevent this. In the August of the same year, Russian forces, assisted by the separationist South Ossetia and Abkhazia invaded Georgia. The war lasted for 16 days and ended with a ceasefire. Russia recognized the separation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from

Georgia. In 2021, European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia maintained its control over separationist regions and was responsible for human rights violations that took place.

3. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine

Under Kuchma, Ukraine's political regime was characterized by its competitive authoritarian nature, favouring the party in power. Kuchma held significant power and manipulated political and economic resources to stay in power. Kuchma tried to amend the Constitution to be able to rule for another term, yet failed and sought a loyal successor: Viktor Yanukovych—who was politically inexperienced and had a questionable past. Yet, he was a strong candidate as he held the position of Prime Minister during the period of economic growth in 2003-2004.

> "'Kuchma and his oligarchic allies saw the election as an opportunity to consolidate autocratic rule and thereby safeguard their personal and clan interests. From their standpoint, the ascent of any non-centrist candidate, whether from the left or the right, would be a disaster because it might lead to a redistribution or confiscation of the assets they had accumulated under Kuchma and even to imprisonment or exile. In addition to the Gongadze murder, Kuchma himself was implicated in a host of other illegal acts, such as ordering violence against journalists and politicians, election fraud, corruption, and arms trafficking'" (Kubicek 181).

Opposition, led by Yushchenko, on the other hand, saw this as their last chance to prevent Ukraine from becoming an authoritarian state.

> "Given setbacks in the late Kuchma years, as well as unfair elections conducted in Russia and Belarus, the opposition knew it had to be ready for dirty tricks. Polls in April 2004 indicated that only 16% of Ukrainians believed a free election was possible, with 70% believing the opposite.3 Kuchma himself, who had used an array of administrative resources and condoned outright falsification of the vote in 2002, ironically predicted that the 2004 elections would be Ukraine's dirtiest. The opposition, however, was ready: exit polls would be used as a check against falsification; international observers would be in Ukraine to minimize election-day shenanigans; independent media—vital given the fact that most of the television stations were in the hands of the state or owned by Kuchma loyalists—did all it could to spread Yushchenko's message and counter negative allegations about him made in state-owned media; and people would be ready to take to the streets in case the election was stolen" (Kubicek 181).

Under mysterious circumstances Yushchenko was poisoned, which severely impacted his health, yet his campaign for the elections continued. Meanwhile, Yanukovych's efforts to garner sympathy through staged incidents backfired. Leading up to the election, Yushchenko had slight polling advantages and strong campaign support both locally and internationally, setting the stage for a highly contested election that would lead to the runoff and the eventual mass protests of the Orange Revolution. In order to win votes of the ethnic Russians, Yanukovych campaigned saying that he will allow dual citizenship with Russia and make Russian the second state language. He portrayed Yushchenko as a radical Ukrainian nationalist—some believed that his wife, born in America, was a CIA agent. "Russian president Vladimir Putin, who was popular among many in Ukraine, campaigned on Yanukovych's behalf. Russian sources allegedly invested $300 million to Yanukovych's campaign coffers. Yushchenko, however, had his own wealthy backers—both in Ukraine and among the Ukrainian diaspora—and ran a professional campaign that made extensive use of the Internet" (Kubicek 182).

In the first round of the presidential elections in 2004, Yushchenko won most of the votes, yet, was not able to achieve the needed outright majority. Thus, a runoff was necessary between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. The runoff election was held in 21 November.

> "Election observers, however, reported numerous problems of election fraud: ballot stuffing, abuse of absentee ballots, large numbers of 'at home' voting, and inflated turnout rates so that in some districts—notably in Donetsk—more than 100% of registered voters turned out to vote. Yushchenko's campaign produced even more damning evidence: phone

calls from the Yanukovych campaign revealing that the Central Election Commission was 'correcting' electoral data as it came in from electoral districts. On November 22, Putin congratulated Yanukovych on his "victory," even though the official results, which indeed did show Yanukovych with a three-point margin of victory (which had been ordered by his campaign) were not released until November 24" (Kubicek 183).

When the controversial election results declared Yanukovych winner by a small difference, large-scale protests erupted. Thousands of people, dressed in the colour of Yushchenko's campaign, orange, gathered in Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti to protest the election results. Yushchenko declared himself the rightful winner and was symbolically sworn in during an incomplete parliamentary session. Yushchenko appealed to the Supreme Court regarding the election fraud, supported by evidence including audiotapes implicating Yanukovych's campaign. Both Yuschenko and Yanukovych mobilized supporters for their cause, increasing tensions.

> "For more than a week, Ukraine teetered on the brink of mass violence. Yanukovych accused the 'Orangeists' of launching an illegal *coup d'état*. Police and military units tried to prevent people from arriving on the Maidan, and efforts were made to stop trains from western Ukraine from coming into the capital. Meanwhile, trains and buses loaded with Yanukovych backers, many of whom were allegedly paid and given free vodka, were brought in from eastern Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine itself, some local leaders threatened to hold a referendum to secede if Yanukovych's victory was overturned. Local police and Interior Ministry troops guarded government buildings, and many feared they would, as they had in 2000, use violence to disperse the crowd. The eyes of the world, however, were turned to Kyiv, and officials from the European Union and the United States voiced support for the protesters and that the election results be nullified" (Kubicek 184).

The standoff between the protesters and the Ukrainian government was tense, however the protests were mostly peaceful and full of cultural and artistic performances. Protestors drive the attention of the international media and garnered support from the internationally community, and local support from western Ukraine, increasing the pressure on the government. The crowd, amidst the solid evidence of the election fraud they had, was not dispersing, and the number of protestors was reaching as high as one million. With the crisis getting bigger members of the ruling party and security forces also began distancing themselves from Yanukovych. President Kuchma proposed a compromise suggesting Yushchenko as the prime minister, while he

Map 12: 2004 Elections Third Round

continued his presidency temporarily. Yushchenko rejected this offer, and the Ukrainian parliament dismissed Yanukovych's government, signalling a shift in power. The Supreme Court soon invalidated the election results, citing fraud, and mandated a new vote. During the process towards the new elections, legislative changes was made to ensure the safety and fairness of the elections. These also included amendments to the constitution to reduce presidential powers, a concession agreed by Yushchenko in exchange for immunity for Kuchma from future prosecution. Yushchenko won the new elections **(Map 12)** with 52% of the votes—Yanukovych's challenge to this result was dismissed and Yushchenko was officially declared as the president in 2005.

4. The Euromaidan Revolution

Yanukovych won the elections in 2010 **(Map 13)** and became the president—his regime was undermined by corruption and poor economic planning, with growth stagnating at under 1% in 2012 and 2013, rising the public discontent over his rule. Since 2007, Ukraine had been negotiating an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, but progress was slow due to concerns over corruption and political imprisonment, including that of Tymoshenko. Russia and

Map 13: 2010 Elections in Ukraine

Yanukovych's own regime was pressuring him to join the Russian Eurasian Customs Union, however, he was more willing to engage with the EU, as a result of economic concerns. Yanukovych was playing a dual game—pressuring Russia for better terms in aid and agreements, playing EU against it. However, he eventually left the EU agreements on table, causing public outrage. The withdrawal from the EU agreement sparked massive protests on the Maidan, initially tied to the anniversary of the Orange Revolution but quickly escalating after police violently attacked protestors. These protests came to be known as the movement of Euromaidan, which was unlike the Orange Revolution, more aggressive and violent, spreading extensively. Yanukovych's regime passed repressive laws, which was proved to be ineffective and the protests continued until 2014. The government was hesitant to deploy massive force against the expanding protests, which now included significant movements in other cities across Ukraine.

In late 2014, the "official opposition" had lost the confidence of the increasingly impatient and radicalized protestors. Yanukovych, having reneged on promises to form a coalition government, intensified his approach by appointing a loyalist as his new Prime Minister and announcing plans to expand the militia and security forces. Conflicts escalated when protester marched to the parliament, many getting injured and buildings getting damaged in the process. The government's efforts to clear the Maidan failed, and the negotiations stalled. The situation worsened with sniper fire from security forces, reportedly supported by Russian personnel and equipment, killing protestors—who in response launched a successful counterattack. Faced with mounting pressure, Yanukovych agreed to form a unity government, restore the previous constitution, and schedule early elections. This agreement also facilitated the release of Tymoshenko by altering the criminal code. However he did not fulfil his promises and fled to Russia. Following Yanukovych's departure, a unity government led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk was established, which quickly moved to disband the Berkut, sign an Association Agreement with the EU, and purge officials from the previous regime. This led to a temporary stabilization in Kyiv, with presidential elections set for May.

> "However, the Euromaidan Revolution was not welcomed by all Ukrainians. Many who had supported Yanukovych, particularly in southern and eastern Ukraine, were fearful of what the new government might do, particularly regarding the status of the Russian language. Russian media, widely watched in much of Ukraine, portrayed the events on the Maidan as an illegal coup, backed by the West, and would usher in a far-right, extreme nationalist government Anti-Maidan rallies were already springing up in some parts of southern and eastern Ukraine even as Yanukovych's regime collapsed in Kyiv" (Kubicek 199-200).

5. The Russian Annexation of Crimea in 2014

Russia started the annexation of Crimea on 20 February 2014 which led to a border conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which ended up being an international crisis. The violent overthrow of the Yanukovych government led to a separatism movement in Crimea. Russian government used this situation to their advantage. With their new policy they started supporting separatists. This policy was a part of Russia's plan on annexing Crimea. Yanukovych fled from eastern Ukraine to Crimea. The Russian government and the Russian military helped him to escape to Russia. "Russia's occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February and March have plunged Europe into one of its gravest crises since the end of the Cold War." (Mankoff 2014).

"It is worth to mention that the intervention of Russian military forces in Crimea started much earlier than it was officially claimed. Along with intensification of the political crisis in Ukraine, Russia sent additional number of soldiers to the Crimean military base, claiming it to be compliant with bilateral agreements with Ukraine. On 21 February 2014, after the escape of president Yanukovych, unidentified armed military personnel started taking control over strategic points of the Crimean Peninsula. After the Russian authorities' decision from 1 March 2014, the Russian armed forces began undercover intervention and in a short time took control over the territory of peninsula, pretending that it was done without the direct use of the military force. Furthermore, until half of April 2014 in all official statements, Russian authorities denied that Russian soldiers are outside their bases. Only on 17 April during the interview for leading Russian broadcasters Putin confirmed the presence of Russian military forces all over the territory of the peninsula in order to 'guarantee the appropriate conditions for expressing the free will by residents of Crimea'. Moreover, he stated that Russian authorities never denied their intention to provide nations of Crimea with the possibility to express their will and for that reason Russian soldiers stood behind the 'Crimean self-defense units' (Ingelevič-Citak 27-28).

On the same day Russian military forces occupied the Crimean parliament and government complexes, Crimean authorities made a special call for the parliament in order to debate on the independence referendum. Referendum took place and Sergey Aksyonov was elected as new prime minister. The voting took place under the presence of Russian armed forces. Ukrainian authorities declared this referendum illegitimate and invalid since Ukrainian constitutional norms were violated; the choice of the prime minister can take place exclusively with approval of the president of Ukraine. This referendum which was done under the repression of Russian military is not legitimate and it's against the laws of Ukraine. "According to official results, 96.77% of voters have supported joining the Russian Federation. Ukrainian government announced that the referendum was illegitimate, unconstitutional, and its results could not be recognized." (Ingelevič-Citak 29). The reliability of this referendum was questioned by Ukraine since the presence of Russian soldiers and other paramilitary groups may have affected voting and there can be falsification of votes.

"On 17 March 2014 the Supreme Council of Crimea proclaimed independence and appealed for accepting the independent state of Crimea as a new member of the international community. Crimean parliament applied to the Russian authorities for accepting Crimea as a new subject of the Russian Federation with the status of a republic. On the same day president Putin signed the Decree No. 147 "On the recognition of the Republic of Crimea" with immediate effect. According to its provisions, due to the outcome of Crimean referendum, Russian Federation had recognized the Republic of Crimea as an independent state with a city of Sevastopol which had a special status. One day later, the agreement on accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed. Its preamble invoked the principle of equality of all nations, and a right for self-determination, according to which every nation has the right to determine its political status, social, cultural and economic development while other states are obliged to respect its decision.

On 21 March 2014 the agreement was ratified by Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Due to its provisions, Crimea and Sevastopol acquired the status of federal subjects of the Russian Federation and the border between Crimea and Ukraine became the

national border of Russia. All residents of the peninsula acquired *ipso iure* Russian citizenship, unless they filed the declaration of keeping Ukrainian

International organizations, in particular UN, OSCE, EU and the European Council, condemned the armed interference of Russia and demanded the Russian authorities to stop violating the international law. The Council of the EU imposed personal sanctions – asset freeze and travel restrictions – on over 130 Russian citizens, mainly politicians and businesspeople. Moreover, the EU applied economic sanctions which limited the access to west capital markets for largest Russian banks, and targeted exchange with Russia in several economic sectors" (Ingelevič Citak 29-30).

Ukrainian authorities declared that the Crimean Referendum as illegitimate, stating that they do not recognize the independence of Crimea, and its integration into the Russian Federation. It was stated that the referenda were violating the constitutional norms of Ukraine. The presence of armed troops was another reason for the invalidity of the referendum.

"On 16 March 2014 UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic said that 'the presence of paramilitary and so-called self-defence groups, as well as soldiers in uniform but without insignia, was not conducive to an environment in which voters could freely exercise their right to hold opinions and the right to freedom of expression'. This was also confi rmed by the Venice Commission in its opinion, dated 21 March 2014, regarding the compatibility of the Crimean authorities' decision with constitutional principles. Commission has stated that 'circumstances in Crimea did not allow the holding of a referendum in line with European democratic standards. Any referendum on the status of a territory should have been preceded by serious negotiations among all stakeholders. Such negotiations did not take place'" (Ingelevič Citak 34-35).

5.1. The Russian Government

"The detailed assessment of Ukrainian crisis and events in Crimea was expressed by president Putin during his interview with media representatives on 4 March 201443. Putin called the situation in Ukraine an unconstitutional takeover and forced seizure of power. In his opinion, newly elected Ukrainian authorities were only partially legitimate and the acting president was definitely not legitimate, as the procedure of impeachment wasn't carried out, therefore, from a legal standpoint, Yanukovych stayed the only legitimate president of Ukraine. Putin told about the decision to provide financial aid for Crimea, which had turned asked Russia for humanitarian support. He denied that Russian troops were deployed on the Crimean Peninsula and asserted that armed groups taking control of Crimea are members of local self-defense groups. He stressed additionally that there was not a single gunshot or a single armed conflict. Moreover, president Putin claimed that the use of force in Ukraine would be the very last resort. However, he also mentioned that there was the legal basis for Russian intervention which was a direct appeal of legitimate Ukrainian president Yanukovych, asking Russia to use the armed forces to protect citizens of Ukraine. Moreover, president Putin claimed that people from eastern regions of Ukraine also asked Russia for help because of uncontrolled crime spread, what would be the next reason for armed intervention. He declared that Russia would do everything to protect these people. It is worth to mention, Putin told journalists, that Russia did not consider the possibility of Crimea joining the Russian Federation, nevertheless the people of Crimea had the right for self-determination, so they could make such a decision.

The position of Russia on events in Ukraine was also presented by Russian prime minister Medvedev during the interview for Bloomberg Television. Medvedev stressed that Russia considered current Ukrainian government as only *de facto* authority, not legitimate because of an unconstitutional way of appointing it. Medvedev denied that Russia has annexed the Crimean Peninsula and stated that Crimean authorities held the referendum, therefore have exercised their right to determine the social, economic and political status of the region. According to the prime minister's opinion, the process of 'secession' of the peninsula was

in full compliance with international law – at first Crimean residents held the referendum and voted in favour of secession from Ukraine, next step was the proclamation of independence of Crimea, which was immediately recognized by Russia and only then the incorporation took place" (Ingelevič Citak 35-36).

6. Separatism in Donbas

Following the Euromaidan Revolution, separatist activities began in Donbas **(Map 14)**, supported by Russia. Donbas is a region in eastern Ukraine, inhabited by a significant ethnic Russian population and was subject to heavy Soviet influence. The roots of the conflict in Donbas were deeply tied to the area's socio-economic and political landscape, heavily influenced by local oligarchs and the legacy of Yanukovych's presidency. The local unrest and separatist movements started with the manipulation of Yanukovych's allies and Russian intervention— with economic and financial incentives offered to local supporters, and the presence of Russian paramilitary units: the

Map 14: Separatism in Ukraine in 2014

"little green men". The administrative buildings were seized by the separationists, declaring the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and establishment of the People's Republics in these regions. Russian authorities were ambitious of expanding their influence, with the concept of "New Russia," however, unification with Russia lacked popular support in Ukraine. The separatists were met with harsh response from the Ukrainian military and volunteer militias. Significant battles took place in cities like Mariupol and Slovyansk, with Ukrainian forces regaining territories. Russian support for the separatists included heavy military equipment and personnel, which escalated the conflict with events such as the shutdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. The Russian supported increased the capacity of the separatist forces in Donbas, allowing them to counter the offensives by Ukrainian military—and even enabled them to reclaim territories, such as Donetsk airport and other strategic locations. This support facilitated a series of advances towards Mariupol with the strategic goal of connecting occupied territories directly to Crimea.

7. The Joint Geneva Statement, Normandy Format and Minsk Agreement

The Joint Geneva Statement[1] was signed by the US, EU, Ukraine and Russia in 2014, following the conflicts.

> "For Russia, the Geneva Agreement accomplished three important goals. First, in Russia's interpretation, it committed the Ukrainian government to refraining from the use of force against the separatists. Second, it intervened in Ukraine's constitutional process, where Russia strongly supported decentralization. Third, it dealt with the crisis as an internal Ukrainian conflict – Russia itself took on no obligations. An additional benefit was that it made no mention of Crimea. Ukraine also saw some advantages. The signing of the agreement represented a *de facto* Russian recognition of the new Ukrainian government, and Ukraine was able to show that it was serious about resolving the conflict peacefully" (D'Anieri 229-230).

In the anniversary of the D-Day, leaders from Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France gathered in Normandy. This meeting started the process of conflict resolution in European terms, removing the US from the talks, while shifting the balance in favour of Russia. With the relief of Donbas separatists, Russia wanted to stabilize their gains, without letting Ukraine to achieve military victory. Ukraine was willing to reach a consensus, as it was scared of the growing military disaster, and the Western governments wanted the conflict the end. As a result of combination of interests, the base of first Minsk agreement was created in September 2014. The increase in casualties forced Ukrainian government into signing a ceasefire, which favoured the Russian and separatist demands. While members of the Normandy Format, France, Germany, and Ukraine saw Minsk as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, Russia insisted that the Minsk agreement should be between Ukraine and Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

> "The 'Protocol on the Results of the Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group,' known initially as the 'Minsk Protocol' and later as 'Minsk-1,' was signed on September 8, 2014. The Normandy format was largely retained, though rather than German and French representatives, the OSCE was represented along with Russia and Ukraine (hence the group was called the 'Trilateral contact group'). The agreement contained twelve points, the first of which was the 'immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.' The third addressed decentralization of power in Ukraine, referring to 'certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.' The ninth point required 'the holding of early local elections in accordance with the Law of Ukraine 'With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions.' Item 10 was 'Remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine.' Significantly, the agreement was signed not only by representatives of Russia and Ukraine, but by representatives of the DNR (Aleksander Zakharchenko) and LNR (Igor

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[1] **Text of the Joint Geneva Statement:** "The Geneva meeting on the situation in Ukraine agreed on initial concrete steps to de-escalate tensions and restore security for all citizens. All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions. The participants strongly condemned and rejected all expressions of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including anti-semitism. All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to legitimate owners; all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated. Amnesty will be granted to protestors and to those who have left buildings and other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of capital crimes. It was agreed that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of these de-escalation measures wherever they are needed most, beginning in the coming days. The U.S., E.U. and Russia commit to support this mission, including by providing monitors. The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine's regions and political constituencies, and allow for the consideration of public comments and proposed amendments. The participants underlined the importance of economic and financial stability in Ukraine and would be ready to discuss additional support as the above steps are implemented.

Plotnitsky). This achieved another Russian goal, having Ukraine recognize the leaders of the separatist republics at the bargaining table" (D'Anieri 239).

Starting from January 2015, strategic requirements led Russians and the Donetsk separatists to launch attacks on various strategic points, that were crucial for communication and logistics—renewing large-scale attacks by the separatist forces.

"The fighting around Debaltseve demonstrated that the Minsk Protocol of 2014 was a shambles. Despite that failure, the parties put the same process into effect in February 2015. On February 7, Germany's Angela Merkel and France's François Hollande developed a new plan after consulting with Poroshenko and Putin. The US government was discussing shipping arms to the Ukrainian government, which Hollande and Merkel feared would lead to further escalation. As before, Ukraine needed to limit the rout of its troops, while Russia was willing to consolidate its latest gains in an agreement. By avoiding the trickiest issues, such as demarcating control of Debaltseve, where lines of control were unclear as the agreement was being drafted, the process strengthened the incentive for both sides to fight more intensely as a ceasefire approached. The new agreement was technically called the 'Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements,' but is generally known as Minsk-2. Major provisions among the plan's thirteen points included withdrawal of 'foreign armed formations,' the holding of local elections, 'decentralization' in Ukraine, and the reestablishment of Ukraine's control over its borders. There were numerous problems. Russia was still denying that it had 'foreign armed formations' in Ukraine, so implementing that crucial measure would be difficult. Equally problematic was the timing of the proposed steps. If local elections were held before the territory was returned to Ukraine's control and in the absence of strong international oversight, Ukraine would regard them as rigged. Ukraine committed to 'decentralization,' but it was not clear exactly what this meant. Greater autonomy at the level of the oblast, which is what it seemed to mean, would require amending the constitution, and opposition to such a move in Ukraine was high. The proposal for greater regional autonomy was seen as a 'poison pill' for Ukraine. It would make Ukraine responsible for rebuilding the devastated regions, while giving the regions (and by extension, it appeared, Russia) a veto over Ukraine's future reform and international orientation. Russia and the separatists had little interest in the withdrawal of Russian forces or in reestablishing Ukraine's control over the border. Each side expected that the commitments it favored were nonnegotiable, while avoiding the commitments that it found unacceptable. The result was an agreement that could not be implemented, but also could not be abandoned" (D'Anieri 239-240).

"A larger international effort to end the fighting, such as introduction of UN peacekeepers, proved to be impossible, as Russia held a veto in the UN Security Council to prevent the UN from acting. The situation in the Donbas evolved into a stalemated, often 'frozen conflict,' similar to what prevailed in Transdniestria in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, separatist enclaves also supported by Russia. (…) Peace talks, however, went nowhere, and cease-fires often failed (the conflict was thus not completely frozen) and had to be renegotiated—by 2022 there had been over two dozen of them. In the interim, Russia also launched numerous cyberattacks against Ukraine. In the sporadic fighting that broke out in Donbas over the course of eight years, thousands more people lost their lives. Various offensives from both sides to retake territory, however, were largely unsuccessful, meaning that the divide between the Ukrainian and Russian/separatist forces remained largely the same from September 2014 until Russian forces launched an all-out assault on Ukraine in February 2022. Tens of thousands of people fled their homes to live on their preferred side of what had become a *de facto* border, and a largely uninhabited 'grey zone' in-between the military forces also developed.19 Meanwhile, human rights organizations noted numerous problems within the separatists' self-proclaimed 'Peoples' Republics,' including corruption, harassment and arbitrary detention of those expressing pro-Ukraine views, and torture and ill-treatment of prisoners" (Kubicek 210-211).

8. Developments Between 2015 and 2021

The conflict between Ukraine and separatists relatively stabilized in 2015, allowing the transportation of people and goods –including the coal necessary for energy production in Ukraine– from the *de facto* border. The separatist regions maintained economic connections with Ukraine. In 2017, Ukrainian veteran volunteers initiated blockades in the border crossings, trying to pressure the separatists to release prisoners, and shift the economic burden of maintaining the occupied territories onto the occupiers. Fearing from the economic consequences and loss of the loyalty of the occupied territories, led by President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Groysman, opposed to the blockade. Responding to the blockade, Russia recognized identity documents issued by the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Separatist nationalized large Ukrainian enterprises, trying to force the Ukrainian oligarchs to influence politics. This shift underscored the Ukrainian government's lack of a monopoly on force, reflecting the legitimacy other actors had in using force within the country. It also highlighted a broad unwillingness among Ukrainians to make significant compromises to end the ongoing conflict, preferring instead to conclude it on Ukraine's terms. The blockade aligned with the national sentiment, marking a significant strategy shift away from engagement and toward coercion of the separatist and Russian forces (D'Anieri 246-247).

For years, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, or the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), had been used by Russia to promote its interests in Ukraine. This church was recognized internationally and historically linked with Russian influence. In contrast, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, or the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) represented the independence and nationalism in Ukraine. The unity of these churches was a symbol of the broader Russian claim over Ukraine, asserting a shared cultural and religious heritage among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This narrative was strategically important for Russia, aligning with its geopolitical aims and the promotion of a 'Russian world.' The Russian Orthodox Church supported this stance, with ties deepened through various means, including the symbolic Cathedral of the Armed Forces opened in Moscow in 2020. In 2016, Ukrainian President Poroshenko initiated a bold move for religious autonomy by appealing to Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, the spiritual leader of Eastern Orthodoxy, for a *tomos*—independence for Ukraine's Orthodox Church. Despite the Russian discontent, Bartholomew eventually granted the *tomos* in 2019, recognizing the UAOC and UOC-KP merger as the new, independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This act effectively severed the centuries-old religious unity that Russia had used to justify its claims over Ukraine. President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov, criticized the move as divisive and a provocation supported by the West (D'Anieri 248-249).

> "A second effort to push back against ideas seen as vestiges of Russian and Soviet colonialism was a new set of laws on 'decommunization' passed in 2015. The impetus for the law was concern that Russian historical narratives that continued to dominate in Ukraine had been weaponized to the detriment of Ukraine. One of the laws was entitled 'On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols,' equating the evils done by the communists with those of the Nazis. By banning Nazi and communist propaganda, this law facilitated the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which some thought interfered with political competition.
>
> (…) Russia gradually seized control of the Sea of Azov, and with it access to ports such as Mariupol, which are important outlets for the Donbas region. The seizure of Crimea gave Russia control of both sides of the Kerch Strait, which controlled access to the Sea. Russia built a bridge across the strait to provide a road and rail link between Russia and Crimea, and the bridge was designed to throttle access to the Sea of Azov by making the strait impassable to large ships that accounted for 20 percent of the traffic. In spring 2018, Russia began stopping and inspecting ships on the way to Ukraine's Azov ports. In November 2018, Russia attacked and seized two Ukrainian ships and a tugboat, along with their crews. While Russia's actions were acts of aggression under international law, there was little Ukraine could do. Some analysts suggested that the West prohibit ships from Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea from docking at western ports. Others advocated ceasing

work on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Ultimately, western governments took no steps beyond expressing concern. The Council of Europe, UN General Assembly, and International Conference on Law of the Sea all passed measures condemning the seizure, but to no effect" (D'Anieri 250-251).

The longstanding tension over Russian gas supplies to and through Ukraine took a significant turn in a Stockholm arbitration court. Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy company, initially claimed that Ukraine's Naftogaz owed $56 billion under a 2009 'take or pay' gas contract clause. However, in December 2017, arbitrators dismissed Gazprom's claim and reduced the obligated purchase amounts. In February 2018, responding to a counter-claim by Ukraine, the arbitrators ordered Gazprom to pay Naftogaz $2.6 billion for failing to supply the agreed amount of gas. In reaction to the court's decision, during a harsh winter period, Gazprom abruptly announced it would cease gas shipments to Ukraine and through Ukraine to Europe. Despite this, Ukraine was less affected than previously, thanks to pipeline modifications that allowed reverse gas flows from Europe. However, the reliance on spot market purchases significantly increased Ukraine's gas costs. Amidst these developments, two key pipeline projects progressed that shifted the dynamics of European gas supply. The Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, nearing completion, were set to enable Russia to deliver gas directly to Germany and Turkey, respectively, significantly reducing its dependence on Ukrainian transit routes and potentially costing Ukraine substantial transit revenue. As the 2009 gas deal approached its 2019 expiration, negotiations for its renewal became strategic.

"In the run-up to Ukraine's parliamentary election in 2019, Putin applied both the carrot and the stick, saying Ukraine could be paying much less for Russian gas but that Russia could completely cease the shipment of gas through Ukraine once the new pipelines came online. Ultimately, an agreement was reached in December 2019, just before the previous one expired. Splitting the difference, it was for five years, expiring in 2024. It appears that delays in the completion of Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream were essential in softening Russia's position. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline itself became the subject of multilateral disputes as it neared completion in 2021. In April, the US imposed sanctions on four Russian ships that were laying pipeline for the project. However, Nord Stream 2 remained a high priority for Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Biden administration hoped to rebuild relations with European allies after the Trump years. The State Department therefore announced in May 2021 that Secretary Anthony Blinken was immediately waiving sanctions on grounds of national interest. As Blinken explained the decision: 'Today's actions demonstrate the administration's commitment to energy security in Europe, consistent with the President's pledge to rebuild relationships with our allies and partners in Europe.' The reactions from various leaders showed how fraught the Nord Stream issue was. Yuriy Vitrenko, CEO of Ukraine's Naftogaz, called Nord Stream 'Russia's most dangerous geopolitical project.' Members of the US Congress from both parties criticized the administration's waiving of sanctions. On the other hand, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas lauded the 'expression of the fact that Germany is an important partner for the US, one that it can count on in the future.' Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: 'The appearance of such publications is quite positive in itself. It's much better than reading that new sanctions are on their way'" (D'Anieri 252-253).

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement came into full force in 2017. It was a program of technical and economic assistance, focusing on decentralization and corruption—it also aimed to align Ukraine's trade laws with the EU standards. As a result, Ukraine's trade with the EU and cooperation with NATO increased—as NATO and Ukraine agreed on "Comprehensive Assistance Package" in 2016. Aiming to strengthen Ukraine to protect its national security, strengthen its defence industry and implement the necessary reforms. The Russian occupation of Crimea and the separation of the DNR and LNR, caused the population that defined themselves as ethnic Russian outside of the Ukrainian electorate system, while the number of people who define themselves with their Ukrainian identity and with the worldview of Ukrainian nationalism increased (D'Anieri 253-257). In 2019, Zelenskyy was elected into the office, acting as a pragmatist, he sought stability. He stated that he will act according to the Minsk agreement, re-establishing the relations with the Russian backed separatists.

"Vladimir Putin declined to offer the traditional congratulatory statement, and in April 2019 Russia announced that it would distribute Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. It appears that Russia sought quickly to test Zelenskyy's mettle and put him on the back foot. Zelenskyy persisted, apparently believing that he could convince Putin to settle the conflict in Donbas, and there were some signs of progress. (…) Zelenskyy sought an early meeting with Putin under the auspices of the Normandy group (Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany), but Putin demurred, making a meeting conditional upon Zelenskyy agreeing to the 'Steinmeier formula.' Advanced by the German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, the 'formula' sought to resolve disagreement over the order of new elections in occupied Donbas and the granting of autonomy to the regions by providing for 'conditional autonomy,' subject to the OSCE certifying that subsequent elections were free and fair. Many in Ukraine adamantly opposed this plan, believing that once autonomy was granted, elections would not be free and fair, while there would be no way to take the autonomy back. (…) Zelenskyy and Putin met on December 9, 2019 but Zelenskyy was constrained both domestically and internationally. (…) At the meeting, the two sides agreed on several potentially important measures including a complete ceasefire by the end of the year, a plan to clear land mines, identification of new areas in which troops would disengage, and additional prisoner exchanges. Most of these were never implemented" (D'Anieri 261-263).

9. Vladimir Putin's Article

In August 2021, Russian president Putin published an article[2] called "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in the Kremlin's website. This article can be seen as the justification of conflicts in 2014, and even as the *jus ad bellum* for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the article, Putin emphasizes the common and shared history of the Russians and Ukrainians.

"First of all, I would like to emphasize that the wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space, to my mind is our great common misfortune and tragedy. These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods of time. But these are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity. The formula they apply has been known from time immemorial – divide and rule. There is nothing new here. Hence the attempts to play on the 'national question' and sow discord among people, the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another (…).

Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But it is important for us to understand that our partner is defending its national interests but not serving someone else's, and is not a tool in someone else's hands to fight against us.

We respect the Ukrainian language **(Map 15)** and traditions. We respect Ukrainians' desire to see their country free, safe and prosperous.

I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people.

Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing

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[2] The article is important to understand the Russian perspective. The link to the article: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

– Russia has never been and will never be 'anti-Ukraine'. And what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide" (Putin).

Putin especially points out Russia's openness for discussions and his recognition and respect for the Ukrainian sovereignty. He states that the future of Ukraine will be determined by its citizens, and not by the Ukrainian authorities that serve the interests of the Western governments. Claiming that Ukrainian sovereignty can only be truly achieved by its partnership with Russia. It can be said that with this article, Putin is trying to reach to the ethnic Russians and pro-Russian

Map 15: Linguistic Map of Ukraine

Ukrainians to garner their support for a united Russia and Ukraine, or at least a close partnership—which would be an asymmetric alliance, Ukraine falling into the Russian orbit and sphere of influence eventually. Putin is not talking to Ukrainian government officials, but is directly addressing the Ukrainian people, trying to get the popular support, also by stating how he respects the Ukrainian culture as well. Considering that Russia invaded Ukraine a year later, this might be seen as the preparation and declaration of the war—meanwhile trying to gain the favour and support of the locals in the upcoming invasion.

10. The New Russian Foreign Policy

"Russia's deployment of 'soft power,' ranging from information operations to subversion, had paid off in 2014 when much of the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet proved ready to switch allegiance and when Russiabacked activists supported secession. In 2016, Putin approved a new 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,' which gave substantial attention to the use of 'soft power.' In contrast to Joseph Nye, who conceived of soft power as the passive attractiveness of a country's culture and foreign policy, the Russian document saw it as a set of 'tools offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies.' In the following years, Ukraine took a series of steps to combat this influence. The fronts in this battle included control of social media, newspapers, and television, as well as the position of Putin's closest supporter and advocate in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk. Before 2015, Russia controlled a great deal of the media that Ukrainians consumed, especially in the east, and Medvedchuk operated freely in support of Putin. By 2021, much of this influence had been curtailed. It is hard to know how this shaped Putin's thinking, but Russia's influence in Ukraine was ebbing.

(…) In February 2021, Zelenskyy, acting on a recommendation of the National Security Council, enacted sanctions that took the stations 112 Ukraine, NewsOne and ZIK off the air for five years and sanctioned Kozak personally. Saying that the stations were funded by Russia, Zelenskyy's spokesperson asserted that 'These media have become one of the tools of war against Ukraine, so they are blocked in order to protect national security.' Then in May, Ukrainian authorities arrested Taras Kozak and Viktor Medvedchuk, who was charged with treason, disproving the belief that Putin's backing made Medvedchuk 'untouchable.' A few days later, Russia began moving forces to Ukraine's border. We do not know exactly why Medvedchuk and Kozak were arrested at that time, after being tolerated for so long. Nor do we know what role this turnabout may have played in convincing Putin that Ukraine would not return to Russia's control without being conquered militarily. 'We could perhaps speculate that the move against Medvedchuk was seen by Putin as the final drop, that Ukraine would never, ever implement the Minsk Accords; that no Russiafriendly politician would ever be allowed into the governmental

coalition in Ukraine; that it would never be amenable to Russian interests'"
(D'Anieri 264-266).

11. Prelude of the Russian-Ukrainian War

In 2021, Russia deployed and announced the movement of several thousands of troops along the Ukrainian border, as well as military equipment—for "large-scale exercises." According to The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, during this process, several ceasefire violations were made. Even though most of the troops departed from the border, as shown by the Russian media, a few thousands remained, making Russia ready for war, allowing it to rapidly mobilize its forces. In a phone call, Chancellor Merkel requested the de-escalation of the tensions along the border—in response "Russia made the statement that 'Vladimir Putin drew attention to the provocative actions of Kiev which is now deliberately aggravating the situation along the line of contact'" (D'Anieri 273). The conflict escalated again, when "Putin claimed that: 'The threat on our western borders is, indeed, rising, as we have said multiple times.' He proposed 'concrete agreements prohibiting any further eastward expansion of NATO and the placement there of weapons systems in the immediate vicinity of Russian territory'" (D'Anieri 273). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg responded saying that only Ukraine and NATO members can decide on the membership of Ukraine, and that Russia has no say or veto power in this matter. American president Biden and Putin held a summit, following the claims that Russia was planning and preparing for an invasion, in which Putin and Biden only repeated their respective policies.

> "On December 17, Russia produced the text of a proposed security treaty that it said would end the crisis. The 'Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization' would require an end to NATO enlargement and a commitment by NATO not to deploy forces to any countries that joined after May 1997. In fact, NATO had not deployed permanent forces in those new member states prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. (…) Although Russia insisted that the proposal had to be accepted in its entirety, NATO members treated it as the opening gambit in a negotiation, and US and Russian diplomats met to discuss it in Geneva on January 10, 2022. (…) On January 28, a Russian readout of a conversation between Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron stated that 'US and Nato responses did not take account of such key Russian concerns as preventing Nato expansion, non-deployment of strike weapons systems near Russian borders, or returning the alliance's military potential and infrastructure in Europe to positions existing in 1997,' adding that Putin would study the proposals before deciding on further steps. On January 31, the UN Security Council met to discuss the crisis. US Ambassador Linda Greenfield-Thompson pointed to the troop buildup and accused Russia of 'painting Ukraine and Western countries as the aggressors, to fabricate the pretext for attack.' Russia's ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, denied that Russia was planning to attack, and said that 'you're almost calling for this, you want it to happen'" (D'Anieri 275-276).

Macron and Putin met—discussing the security architecture of Europe and NATO, at the opposite ends of a 6 meters long table (**Image 1**). The British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Foreign Minister Lavrov held a private meeting. The conversations between the Western leaders and the Russians continued for a while.

> "Putin made his decision: Russia would recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Putin once again played the historian, advancing a series of grievances, nationalist myths, half-truths, and falsehoods

Image 1: Putin-Macron Meeting

about Ukrainian aggression to justify Russia's claims to Ukrainian territory. Particularly surprising to many observers was his argument that 'modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia, or to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia … Lenin and his associates did it in a way that was extremely harsh on Russia – by separating, severing, what is historically Russian land.' Leaving aside Putin's creative history, the bitter criticism of the Soviet regime led many to wonder whether Putin sought not to recreate the Soviet Union, but rather the Russian Empire as it existed in 1914, which included the Baltic states, Finland, and much of present-day Poland. The speech also advanced the thesis that Ukraine was led by led by farright nationalists and neo-Nazis who were waging genocide against Russians. This theme was to become a focus of Russian propaganda as the war went on. Putin claimed that it was Ukraine that was in fact attacking Russia: 'they have opted for aggressive action, for activating extremist cells, including radical Islamist organizations, for sending subversives to stage terrorist attacks at critical infrastructure facilities, and for kidnapping Russian citizens.' He presented NATO cooperation with Ukraine as preparation for an eventual attack on Russia. Putin was laying out the justification for a much broader war on Ukraine" (D'Anieri 279-280).

12. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022

"On February 24, just before 6.0 a.m. Moscow time, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was beginning a 'special military operation' to 'demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.' (…) he insisted that 'We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.' He appealed to the Ukrainian people to 'work together with us so as to turn this tragic page as soon as possible' and to the Ukrainian military 'to immediately lay down arms and go home. (…) The military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.' He closed the speech by threatening the West: 'No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.' This threat reverberated in the coming months, as Western governments assessed the likelihood that Russia would use nuclear weapons and the circumstances in which it might do so" (D'Anieri 286).

Map 16: The Russian-Ukrainian War

Responding to the invasion (**Map 16**), the West prepared sanctions, most importantly on the construction of Nord Stream 2, and the foreign assets of Russian oligarchs. The West wanted to avoid war with Russia, and any use of nuclear weapons—preferring sanctions instead.

"The goal was to inflict such a heavy blow on Russia's economy and on its oligarchs that pressure would build within Russia to end the war. Failing, that, the goal was simply to punish Russia for the death and destruction that it was bringing to Ukraine. Eventually, a long list of sanctions was put in place, a partial list of which included: The freezing of Russia's $630 billion in foreign currency reserves, which made it harder for Russia to pay debts denominated in dollars. Removal of many (but not all) Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system used to conduct international payments. The exclusion

of Russian banks from various countries' financial systems. Freezing by Germany of the approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Sanctions on large number of Russian officials and 'oligarchs,' including Putin's adult children. These sanctions included asset freezes, seizures of luxury yachts, and the forced sale of the Chelsea Football (soccer) Club in London by Putin associate Roman Abramovich. A ban on the export of 'dual-use' technologies, which can have military as well as civilian applications. A ban on Russian airline flights from US, Canadian, EU, and UK airspace.

Equally important was what was not included in the sanctions. Europe continued to buy natural gas and oil from Russia, while making plans to decrease dependence on Russian energy. Russia remained able to sell oil around the world. Because oil is transported by tanker rather than pipeline, it was much more easily redirected to countries not enacting sanctions. As a result of spikes in global energy prices due to the war, Russia actually made more revenue from energy exports during the war than it had before, while energy prices spiked in the US and Europe. In that important respect, sanctions backfired. The short-term impact of sanctions was also blunted by the capable policy response of the Central Bank of Russia, which ably used currency controls to maintain the value of the Ruble" (D'Anieri 296-297).

13. The Wagner Coup

Yevgeny Prigozhin was the leader of a Russian private military company (PMC) named the Wagner Group—which had a several thousand fighter in 2017–2018, later increasing their numbers to nearly 50,000. The Russian government provided the Wagner Group with large resources, although it never had any official position under the government—remaining outside of the Russian law, legislation and military hierarchy. During the Syrian war, Prigozhin criticized the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu for the outdated methods used by the Russian army, increasing the tensions. The influence of Wagner and Prigozhin increased during the Ukrainian War, when Russian leadership wanted to topple Ukraine quickly, yet failed with growing causalities. While Putin delayed a mobilization act, Russian authorities seek solution in recruiting mercenaries and paramilitary companies. Besides the DNR and LNR militias, *silovik*[3] forces started taking part in the conflict as well. In 2022, after the plans of Ukrainian invasion failed, Wagner was requested to join into the conflict— Prigozhin's mercenaries departed Africa and took part in the Battle of Popasna in the matter of weeks. During this period, Wagner received increasingly large resources and rights—it gained its own aviation and heavy artillery forces, and the permission for recruiting criminals from prisons, offering them freedom in exchange for their service. Wagner served as Prigozhin's private army—him getting more influential and known amongst the public. Wagner became mentioned in the state media and adds were seen advertising the company. The video of Yevgeny Nuzhin's execution by a sledgehammer appeared in the internet in November 2022, contributing to Prigozhin's image as a military leader—number of Russian military officers supporting him, as a result of the incompetence of the Russian commanders.

It is said that Putin was using Wagner to keep the Russian elite and oligarchs, that had doubts about the invasion, and Defence Minister Shoigu in line. The Russian Ministry of Defence stated that Wagner was dependent on them for ammunition and logistics. Prigozhin continued to operate as per the Presidential Office's requests. In December 2022, Wagner group sounded accusations against the Ministry of Defence, Wagner forces complaining and swearing to the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, as there have been problems with logistics, and shells were not delivered to their units. In January 2023, Wagner and Ministry of Defence argued on whose prize it was to capture Soledar. In February and May 2023, while addressing to the Ministry of Defence, Prigozhin harshly citizen Shoigu and his family's extravagant lifestyle.

With the Russian winter offensive, Wagner was the only Russian force that was successful during the campaign, capturing Bakhmut, with heavy losses. Prigozhin made statements complaining about "shell hunger" and ammunition problems, addressing the Russian Ministry of Defence in a video making the

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[3] *Silovik* is the Russian word for anyone that works for a state organization that has the authority to use force against foreign threats or citizens.

request. However, around this time a video of Wagner soldier shooting the portraits of General Gerasimov and the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Alexander Lapin started circulating in internet—Prigozhin claimed that video was fake. Prigozhin continued to publish more videos arguing that the Ministry of Defence has ammunition but not giving it to Wagner on purpose, accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov personally for creating a deliberate shortage. Ministry of Defence stated that these requests will be met. Showing the artificial ammunition shortage as reason, Prigozhin threatened to retreat from Bakhmut, also revealing that Wagner was no more allowed to recruit from prisoners—he said that if they will have to retreat, they will ask the question of who really betrayed to the motherland. In May, Ministry of Defence ensured Prigozhin that his needs will be met through General Sergei Surovikin, which did not take place. In June, Wagner retreated from Bakhmut, claiming that their escape routes were mined by the Ministry of Defence. On June 5, the commander of the Russian 72nd Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Roman Venevitin was kidnapped and beaten by the Wagner forces. Prigozhin was also getting popular, he was fighting in the internal front as well,

Map 17: The Wagner Rebellion

as a truth teller. The Ministry of Defence requested Wagner to sign a contract—which would integrate and make it a sub-division of the Russian military. Yet the attempt for the integration of Wagner failed.

It is said that the Russian Federal Security Service discovered the preparations of the rebellion, two days before the scheduled date, forcing it to start earlier than planned. Prigozhin was planning to capture Shoigu and Gerasimov during their joint planned visit to southern border of Ukraine. Prigozhin was hoping that the armed forces would join to his rebellion. In a video, Prigozhin accused the Ministry of Defence for deceiving the president and Russian people for the interests of the Russian oligarch, and claiming false reasons for the occupation of Ukraine. He denied the claim that Ukraine escalated the tensions before the start of the war. He published a video stating that the Ministry of Defence attacked Wagner's rear camps with missiles. Prigozhin declared his armed struggle against the Ministry, and called for support from the Russian citizens. After the capture of Rostov-on-Don by the Wagner forces **(Map 17)**, Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and Deputy Chief of Staff Vladimir Alekseyev held a meeting with Prigozhin, trying to convince him to withdraw his forces, yet, Prigozhin continued his march to Moscow. While the city of Moscow took counter-terrorism measures, the Russian Federal Security Service raided the Wagner headquarters in St. Petersburg— 10 billion Rubles was found in cash.

In Syria, to prevent the spread of the rebellion, Russian military cracked down the Wagner forces stationed in the region. The head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, stated that his forces were en route to confront the Wagner forces and preserve the Russian state. Negotiations were made with the chief of staff Anton Vaino, the secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and the Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko, with Putin refusing to participate. Lukashenko acted as a mediator to de-escalate the situation. Prigozhin agreed to settlement to prevent further bloodshed and assuring that this was not a coup attempt. Wagner forces began their retreat. In his address to nation, Putin declared Wagner's actions as treason and promised harsh response to it, while promising the members of the Wagner who got dragged into conflict a truce. After the rebellion, the value of Ruble declined, reaching to its lowest exchange rate since March 2022. In August, Prigozhin's plane crashed during its flight to St. Petersburg, from Moscow, Prigozhin and nine others were killed in the plane crash—or allegedly assassinated with the plane being shot down.

National Security Challenges in the Aftermath of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

1. State and Sovereignty

A state is not an equal of a nation, which is the collection of people who share a common culture, history and language, therefore a common national identity. Whereas, a state is a sovereign, territorial entity; inhabited by citizens and governed by national leaders, according to IR scholars. Political scientists argue that A state must be able to exercise internal and external sovereignty; its institutions being recognized as public institutions of the civil society; the state is the exerciser of domination and legitimation; and it is a territorial association. The state is the sole sovereign inside its territories, by definition, yet there are limits of the state exercising its legitimate power.

States by their political nature have the primary concern of establishing security in order to protect their sovereignty and this is the main interest of any and all state, according to Realists. States in foreign policy act according to their interests and engage with other states in *diplomatie publique*, trying to maximize their capacity and capabilities. As the state is an entity that is rationally guided and led by national leaders, national interests are concluded by a cost and benefit analysis. These national interests do not change over time or according to different governments, as they are permanent, which creates the realpolitik. States seek for balance of power, in which they often pursue to form and join into alliances to naturalize a possible threat by matching to its power as an alliance and try to promote collective security as the actors of international system. Yet, states in cooperation always worry about the relative gains, as they are concerned about what if the other party gains more advantages from this act of cooperation. Therefore, in interstate cooperation, two state in an agreement always try to gain more than the other, as it is not possible for one state to trust into another's intentions. Nevertheless, as a result of security dilemma, states can never trust or be sure of other states' intentions. Thus, state feels insecure and under a security threat, increase its capacity, build up army and form alliances to prevent getting invaded by another state, which causes other states to do same as well as they feel threatened. The result of security dilemma is power against power (or power balancing), in which individual states try to enhance their power by internal balancing[4] and external balancing[5].

Other than the internal political mechanisms, such as the constitution or regime of the country, there are international agreements that states are signatories or inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) that have binding effects which may shape and limit a state's sovereignty and the way it exercises its authority.

When defining what is the state political philosopher Hegel states:

> "The state, which is the realized substantive will, having its reality in the particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal, is absolutely rational. This substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In this end freedom attains its highest right. This has the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the state. Were the state to be considered as exchangeable with the civic society, and were its decisive features to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would then be at one's option to be a member of the state. —But the state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it. Union, as such, is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result.

> (a) The idea of the state has direct actuality in the individual state. It, as a self-referring organism, is the constitution or internal state organization or polity.

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[4] **Internal Balancing:** A state increasing its own power resources—economic, technological, development in defence and military capabilities. (Like how Bismarck unified Germany under Prussia).

[5] **External Balancing:** States enter into security alliances with other states to counter rival and aggressor states.

(b) It passes over into a relation of the individual state to other states. This is its external organization or polity.

(c) As universal idea, or kind, or species, it has absolute authority over individual states. This is the spirit which gives itself reality in the process of world-history.

The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom. In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their complete development. In this concrete freedom, too, the rights of personal individuality receive adequate recognition" (Hegel 194-199).

2. International Law and Organizations

One of the main purposes of international law and international institutions is the collective security; when a member state is under risk of invasion, other states go to rescue (such as NATO article 5) or apply collective punishments against the aggressor (economic sanctions). UN has two missions to protect peace: peace-making and peace-keeping. UN peace-making is the process in which UN takes effective role to prevent an outbreak of a conflict, it is done before the war—usually in the scenarios where there are tensions between two ethnic parties and a threat of civil war. UN peace-keeping is done by UN after a civil war, where UN meditates terms for a cease fire and sends a peace-keeping force to stand between warring parties, currently there are 18 missions in total, most of them in the Sub-Saharan Africa.

From a liberal perspective, international law and organizations are significant as they help states to resolve the collective action dilemmas[6], that occur from mixed interests. States are rational actors and would like to maximize their gains, according to their own interest, and creating a platform where states can resolve their issues regarding to trust—transparency, eliminates the chaotic nature of the international system; increasing the collective good and everyone being better-off. The world of international institutions is based on cooperation, with significant incentives for compliance. On the contrary realists argue that international law and organizations are created by and reflect the interests of the powerful states.

International law specifies the rights and obligations states have with respect to other states, actors and their citizens; the universal international law generally applied in the international system is the "law of the UN", which is the UN Charter. In the international system, becoming a part of a "law" or treaty is completely voluntarily done, as there is no universal enforcement of law, unlike the domestic legal system of countries. There are different "islands" of international law that cover different topics, and are not coherently bind with a legal hierarchy—hierarchy of norms and do not intervene within each other's spheres of law. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon domestic legal system, in the international jurisdiction (with the exception of ICC) there is no "precedent decision" or referring back to previous cases. If one party wishes to sue another, the consent of the other part is required.

The effectiveness of international law and organizations are debated as participation, adherence and compliance with them is voluntary, and they do not have a binding effect; as there is no global enforcer of the law or a central enforcement (with exceptions such as the WTO)—as in the sense that not like the domestic system, and international security and peace is not compulsory especially for major powers, as they tend to break their own international law obligations (such as the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US or Russia's invasion of Ukraine) and legitimacy issues, where some international institutions lose their legitimacy with humanitarian tragedies. Liberals argue that democratic states tend to comply and adhere more than the authoritarian states, as they have wider range of veto players in the domestic politics; democratic system requires more consent from the decision makers. An example to this can be given from Turkey, where the parliament is a veto power, and in order for Sweden's application to NATO to be accepted, it had to be voted in the parliament with a simple majority. Implementation and

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[6] **Collective Action Dilemma:** Multiple actors that have relative gains ("selfish-interests") choose not to cooperate, but they are better of all together, as it maximizes gains for everyone. (See Game Theory "Prisoner's Dilemma").

approval of agreements and legal decisions is harder in democratic states, however when its embraced, commitment to these treaties are more faithful; in authoritarian regimes, executives are unconstrained when it comes to non-compliance with international agreements.

International organizations become more effective over time and they provide monitoring in which every member state can monitor compliance, which resolves the security dilemmas. Nevertheless, realists argue that there are only two conditions where a state comply with the international law and treaties voluntarily. First possibility is that there has to be a situation where states are facing with a common enemy; where they form alliances and international organizations and make promises to each other, in this scenario they are more likely to comply and keep the promises made, for example formation of NATO against the Soviet threat. In the second scenario, there is a condition of hegemony, where there is a hegemonic power that creates a mechanism, and most of the time forces members, which is not voluntary in nature, for instance the Soviets creating the Warsaw Pact. According to the realists, great powers comply with the international law as they negotiate these laws to fit their own national interests, and will therefore agree to accept its obligations; they create institutions to serve their interests and that why they comply with the decisions of this institutions.

3. Legitimate Use of Force (Jus ad Bellum)

The authorization of the UNSC is required for the legitimate use of military force, creating a *jus ad bellum* basis for initiating war. For instance, during the Gulf War as a result of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, UNSC authorized the use of force by the US. Nonetheless, during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the "evidence" presented by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell was the satellite images of mass destruction weapons made by the Saddam regime, led to the illegal occupation of Iraq by the US/UK coalition powers, in the name of "war on terror," without authorization from the UNSC. It was discovered that Colin Powell was lying at the UNSC about evidences, as there have been no weapons of mass destruction found. Another instance is the extensive use of veto power in the UNSC by Russia (and China, except most of the humanitarian issues) on the US drafts regarding the Syrian Civil War and vice versa, with Russia vetoing a total of 20 resolutions. Other than the UNSC authorized wars, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect are arguably cases of jus ad bellum as well.

4. Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Responsibility to protect (R2P) is the concept in which the Westphalian norms of non-intervention is given away because the civilians are vulnerable or in danger; international community has to protect the civilians to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. The implementation of R2P is done by the UNSC successfully authorizing the use of force; which happened once in history with the only case being Libya, where military force was used against the Gaddafi regime, with Russia and China abstaining during the voting process. This intervention ended up with the Libyan state collapse and civil war, and Gaddafi being massacred before he could be taken to court. In Syria R2P could never be triggered, yet the Obama administration in the US almost used force to take out the Assad regime, which was prevented by the diplomatic efforts of the Russian Federation who convinced Assad regime to eliminate its chemical weapons to prevent an American intervention.

5. Power and Types of Power

There is always an objective or a tangible outcome, and power in the its broadest sense is the ability to achieve that desired outcome. Power effects the decision-making process, as people who have power influence the process and content of decision. There are ways of influencing the decision-making process: "the use of force or intimidation (the stick), productive exchanges involving mutual gain (the deal), and the creation of obligations, loyalty and commitment (the kiss)" (Heywood 46). During the decision-making process, there is always agenda setting present as well. Agenda setting is the ability to prevent certain decision from being made by setting new agendas or changing the pressing issues, and offering alternatives to the existing decisions. Power is also the ability to influence others and as a form of indoctrination or psychological control, being able to shape what one thinks, and used specifically and intentionally for ideological reasons—as a form of thought control.

Authority is the legitimate power—"whereas power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others, authority is the right to do so" (Heywood 37). Max Weber talks about three types of authority: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. In international relations, it one wishes to influence others, their authority's base should be legal and rational, therefore legitimate, taking its power from legal and rational sources. Therefore, authority is based on an acknowledged duty to obey.

5.1. Hard Power

This type of power is based on resources such as military power, force, sanctions, intimidation, payments and bribes. This type of power makes a state able to achieve its goals via means that create a sense of superiority or subduing others, with a combination of economic and military power. Furthermore, theorist Joseph Nye suggests that others' behaviours can be affected by "inducements ('carrots') or threats ('sticks')" (5). In the basic force model of power, military capacity enables a state to be able to protect its territories and citizens from other aggressor states and be able to pursue its national interests outside its sovereign territories via conquest, expansion or invasion. Therefore, military capability: the size, quality, equipment and means of the armed forces is crucial.

5.2. Soft Power

This type of power is the "co-optive power" which is the ability to shape others preferences by attraction, rather than coercion as Nye suggests. Soft power largely operates through "three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)" (Nye 11). One example can be the 'American Dream' which had effects all over the world that spread through American cultural influence via Hollywood. Soft power is the ability to influence and effectively determine what others think, want, need and prefer—aligning them with the state's best interest and benefits.

5.3. Smart Power

Smart power is the combined use of hard and soft power—employment of strategies regarding diplomacy, persuasion and capacity building. Looking at contemporary political developments around the world, it could be said that the usage of hard power is in decline, owing to the great powers' willingness to avoid direct confrontation, with total war being out of the question. Nonetheless, Russia used hard power in 2022 with its invasion of Ukraine, proving that hard power is still a relevant concept. Soft power is often used by culture giants of the world that produce variety of goods ranging from TV series to artists—the US, Japan, South Korea and China are some of the dominant producers of such goods.

6. Instruments of Foreign Policy

States use strategies to achieve their national interests—strategy is the totality of objectives and instruments designed and divided based on the means available. There can be long-term, short-run or grand strategies to achieve economic, financial or military goals.

6.1. Coercive Instruments

Economic Sanctions: has the goal of leading a change in the behaviour of a target state's foreign policy. There are various ways a state might press economic sanctions, such as trade restrictions—restricting a country's access to another's market, embargo on goods, financial sanctions and asset freezes.

Covert Operations: are secret operations conducted in foreign territories without letting the target country know.

Propaganda: is the selective use of information or misinformation to effect the target country's foreign policy.

Military Force: is the use of armed forces to engage in direct confrontation, no longer seeking for peaceful means for conflict resolution.

<u>Cyber-Operations:</u> targets the digital infrastructure of a state, with the use of manipulation of information in internet and media to effect foreign policy.

<u>Coercive Diplomacy:</u> happens when the diplomats clearly conceive the message that if the target country does not change their foreign policy, there will be harsh consequences.

6.2 Persuasive Instruments

Persuasion is to convince or induce things so that the other party can change their behaviour.

<u>Diplomacy:</u> is to achieve foreign policy goals without going to a war or getting involved in any conflict but use peaceful instruments and benefit from diplomatic expertise.

<u>Economic Incentives:</u> is offered by governments to a country to convince them to a certain path of foreign policy—great powers are often the most persuasive as to what they can offer. The main goal is to lead the target country act in a certain foreign policy path that is 'friendly' and beneficial for the interests of the sender country. Economic incentives can be offered through foreign aid mechanisms and institutions, financial aids and economic agreements or it might be conditional—countries have expectations, and attach certain conditions to the economic or diplomatic relationship they will create.

7. Security

In IR a state's main goal is national security. Essentially, the reason for this routes back to establishment of the state, as a concept.

According to political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in the State of Nature, humans are created with equal abilities and capability, therefore, in the case where two person demands the ownership of the same thing—which both can obtain at the same time—they become enemies and desire to destroy or subjugate each other by force, over it (183-185). Thus, humans look to conserve themselves to have security, as others may pursue greater power for their own gains, safety or reputation—in the absence of a great common power that is able to subdue others and spread fear of death that will pacify them, humans will continue to be in the status quo of war, in which there can be no concept of injustice (185-188). Hobbes argues that, as a result of the State of Nature, humans instinctively spend effort to establish peace—for self-preservation—when there is a common understanding. Humans are willing to give up some of their rights—as long as its mutual—which will allow them to have some freedom from each other; otherwise, if they don't give up their rights and continue to exercise full liberty, the condition of war will remain. Humans transfer their rights to the Sovereign, which is the common power, in a mutual trust that the Sovereign will establish order and justice. Sovereign uses these power and rights given for preventing the conflict and chaos the State of Nature creates; establishes and oversees the societal order which is just and that let every man benefit from their liberty, in a limited matter, that allows societies to meet in a common ground and live together, preventing the state of war.

Another political philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau forms similar arguments to Hobbes, while he diverts from him in certain points. In the state of nature, Hobbes argues that every man is in war with each other and Rousseau criticizes this claim, stating that war is not a relationship of man, it is of states. Where states fight, man are a part of this war as soldiers, not as citizens (46-47). According to Rousseau, to end the state of nature—that is corrupted by property and society—and for the means of self-preservation, there is a need for a sum of forces, which will arise from the association called the social pact. The purpose of this association is to use the common force to protect the people and their property, while they remain free (49-50).

When Hobbes talks about the Sovereign, it is possible to interpret it as an individual or assembly. Nevertheless, in the modern world, the rights Hobbes and Rousseau suggest that people give to the Sovereign, is given to the state as a public institution. With contrasts, Hegel, agreeing this philosophers, argues that the state is responsible for the protection of rights and freedoms—therefore overall security of its citizens. Then it can be concluded that security is the main reason for the state's existence.

8. Liberal IR Theory Approach to Security

The Liberal theory of IR is not a naïve perception of the world; therefore, it does not deny that the international system is anarchic. Nevertheless, the lack of global governance and enforcement is a reality, which liberals believe it's negative effects can be mitigated. Thus, liberals offer these four propositions:

8.2. Commercial Liberalism

Joseph Nye is one of the liberal theorists that suggest this form of liberalism. As a result of globalization—the network of increased economic exchange, and therefore economic interdependence, has a pacifying effect on states, making war unthinkable and diminishing its possibility—preventing anarchy turning into conflicts. Typical cases being the US-Canada and Germany-France. Free trade and investments creates vested interests against armed conflict—actors which benefit from economic interdependence trying to prevent wars. There are examples of geopolitical rivals not fighting because of close economic interdependence that was created during the Cold War era—Greece-Turkey, China-India and South Korea-Japan are some of the cases. Arguing against this claim, Realists state that South Korea and Japan for instance, are the part of the same alliance structure under the patronage of the US, as China seems to be a bigger security threat that causes these states to rather cooperate than become rivals. Another criticism points out to the economic interdependence between Russia and Turkey, stating that there is an asymmetric relationship that favours the more powerful state.

8.3. Democratic Peace Theory

This theory is the closest to becoming a law in IR. Democratic Peace theory claims that democracies do not fight with each other. The given reason for this is the mechanisms of democracy—citizens of democratic countries do not wish to fight with other democratic countries' citizens. The root and philosophical origin of this theory is in Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" in which he argues that republics will not fight each other. Nevertheless, realists criticize this theory stating that this might be empirically true, nonetheless, consolidation of democracy is relatively new and archival research shows that democratic powers came to the brink of war many times, yet, the balance of power was what prevented them from going to war—an example case being the Suez Crisis, in which the UK and France had rising tensions with the US.

8.4. Functionalism

Functionalism suggests that the growth of international institutions and legal agreements create a 'link' of peace. States establish international institutions with a particular function, which strengthens and promotes cooperation amongst states, and reduces the possibility of wars, as states tend to discuss their frustrations in a diplomatic environment. Some of the most famous cases—WTO was created to discuss trade disputes and IMF to prevent economic crisis.

8.5. Transnationalism/Cosmopolitanism

Transnationalism suggests that citizens and other economic actors of various origin states engage in cross-border activities, which make war unthinkable for them. Cosmopolitanism suggests the creation of a global society—a united global society, as cooperation is by nature. The EU, as a supranational organization, came closes to fulfilling this dream.

Liberals argue that international law and organizations has an important function and mission of helping states resolve collective action dilemma that emerge from mixed interests. States are rational actors and therefore would prefer to maximize their own interests. Creating a platform for states to allow them to resolve their security dilemmas and 'trust issues'—at the same time creating a space for international knowledge exchange, where state can learn from each other—eliminates the anarchic nature of the international system. Via the collective good, every state is better-off as the gains are maximized for everyone. With respect for the international law and transparency among states, collective interests are created, which states can use to maximize their own national interests and gains. In the world of international institutions and cooperation, incentives for compliance is a necessity.

9. Realist IR Theory Approach to Security

Realists argue that the international system in inherently conflictual. Sovereign territorial states, their interest and behaviours are the main actors that shape the international system. Realists accept that there are non-state actors, however, it is argued that their interests and behaviour alone is not powerful enough to shape the international order. States are primarily rationally guided, and led by national leader that calculate the costs and benefits to maximize the gains of the state, according to its national interests. National interests do not change over time, as they are permanent. In *realpolitik*, national interests dominate global politics, and security concerns in foreign policy making. States operate in a world that is characterized and led by anarchy—as there is no clear hierarchy between the states in the international system, unlike domestic structure, there is no higher force or law enforcement that act as a control-mechanism. The lack of a world government to control the state behaviour causes anarchy. According to Realists, security is the central problem of IR, and it is an inherently competitive endeavour—security dilemma is a key concept of Realist IR theory. Realists have five main prepositions[7].

9.1. Balance of Power

States seek a balance of power in the world order. States pursue joining or forming alliances to counter the external threats, with collective security alliances. States can promote security on their own as an individual member of the international system or together with the alliance system. The goal for the state is to increase its capabilities and capacity to prevent the domination of opposing and rival states.

9.2. Security Dilemma

States takes steps and measures, such as increasing their military equipment and capabilities, to become more secure, yet the state ends up less secure, as other states of the international system react to this increase of capacity–by starting to increase their own capabilities. Therefore, creating a vicious cycle.

9.3. Relative Gains

Absolute gains suggest that one state has the advantage over another in the production of a good, as its costs is lower and the production is more efficient. Absolute gains suggest that if state A is more efficiently producing the good X, and state B is producing good Y in a similar capability—then instead of state A and state B trying to produce good X and Y on their own, they should trade to prevent the waste of resources, and both of the states are better off this way. Relative gains, on the other hand, argue that during this trade, one state will always be better off, and the gains will be asymmetrical, not equal. Therefore, the gains one state makes, compared to the rival, causes the state with less gains to loose advantages. When two states engage in cooperation, they will always worry that other side will gain more, forcing the state itself to follow a pathway to gain more. In interstate cooperation between two states, they will always try to gain more than the other, and the intentions of the other state cannot be trusted.

9.5. Hegemonic Power Transitions

When the leading powerful state of the international order; the hegemon, starts losing its power and other states become more powerful—other states' power matching up with the hegemon, will lead to wars. Historically, these are power wars or the Thucydides Trap[8]. Realist theoretician, John Mearsheimer, sees the trade wars between the US and China in a similar manner. In the 20th century, there has been only one instance of peaceful hegemonic power transition—the UK lost its hegemonic

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[7] More detailed explanation is located under the "State and Sovereignty" chapter.

[8] **The Thucydides Trap:** "More than 2,400 years ago, the Athenian historian Thucydides offered a powerful insight: 'It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.' Others identified an array of contributing causes of the Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides went to the heart of the matter, focusing on the inexorable, structural stress caused by a rapid shift in the balance of power between two rivals" (Allison 73).

power in the Suez Canal Crisis, as the US intervened and prevented a war between the UK and Egypt. Therefore, the UK lost its hegemonic power to the US.

9.6. Nationalism

The international system is mostly composed of nation-states. The search for power and wealth, shapes the usage of power in the IR—as states pursue their national interests.

9.7. Structural Realism

Structural Realism, as an IR theory, looks into the structure of the international system and world order, and determines its effects on the state behaviour. As an extension of realism, structural realism also argues that the primary aim of a state in the international system is to pursue its interests and achieve to its foreign policy aims, with the main goal being the security and survival of the state within the anarchy of the system. Structural Realism argues that the immitigable anarchy of the system is the cause of conflict and war—this anarchy is permanent and cannot be changed by any actor within the system, without changing the system itself. The state interaction and behaviour is governed by this international structure of the system. Anarchy caused by the lack of global governance and enforcement or an authority is the defining factor of this structure. Other defining factor of the structure is the states' capability and function. The distribution of capabilities—the power of the state is the determinant for its survival.

9.8. Offensive Realism

Offensive Realists, such as Mearsheimer, argue that a state should maximize its capacity and power—whereas Defensive Realists like Kenneth Waltz states should show caution against power accumulation after a certain point, as it will have negative consequences due to balance of power, as pursuing hegemony is destructive for the state.

9.9. Defensive Realism and Capacity Building

Defensive Realists argue for "appropriate power," taking into consideration strategic concerns, possible reactions from neighbouring states and the balance of the international system. Capacity building—as a result of security dilemma and balance of power concerns, states seek to increase their relative capacities to ensure their security in the international arena and develop capacity to pursue their national interests. By the nature of IR, capacity building requires the mutually assured destruction principle as well—with respect to defensive structural realism. A state can ensure its survival via developing its capacity to either be unmatchable and become the hegemon of the system -offensive realism- or increase its power to an appropriate level to be able to compete with other states of the international order and defend itself from any hostile and offensive action –defensive realism- either way being able to retaliate is an important defence strategy.

10. The Just War Theory

The Just War is a theory developed by political scientist Heywood, on the principle that wars needs to be and should be justified—since war is a natural outcome of the *realpolitik*. For a war to be justified, it needs *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Heywood, lists the principles of these concepts as follows:

"Principles of *jus ad bellum* (just recourse to war):

- Last resort. All non-violent options must have been exhausted before force can be justified. This is sometimes seen as the principle of necessity.
- Just cause. The purpose of war is to redress a wrong that has been suffered. This is usually associated with self-defence in response to military attack, viewed as the classic justification for war.
- Legitimate authority. This is usually interpreted to imply the lawfully constituted government of a sovereign state, rather than a private individual or group.

- Right intention. War must be prosecuted on the basis of aims that are morally acceptable (which may or may not be the same as the just cause), rather than revenge or the desire to inflict harm. *Jus in bello* principle). For example, a wholesale invasion is not a justifiable response to a border incursion.

Principles of *jus in bello* (just conduct in war):

- Reasonable prospect of success. War should not be fought in a hopeless cause, in which life is expended for no purpose or benefit.
- Proportionality. Overlapping with jus ad bellum, this holds that the force used must not be greater than that needed to achieve an acceptable military outcome, and must not be greater than the provoking cause.
- Discrimination. Force must be directed at military targets only, on the grounds that civilians or non- combatants are innocent. Death or injury to civilians is therefore only acceptable if they are the accidental and unavoidable victims of deliberate attacks on legitimate targets, sometimes seen as collateral damage.
- Humanity. Force must not be directed ever against enemy personnel if they are captured, wounded or under control (prisoners of war). Together with the other jus in bello principles, this has been formalized over time, in the so called 'laws of war'" (Heywood 254).

11. Reasons of the War, Security Concerns and Peace Negotiations

At the start of the war, Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022, Ukrainian president Zelensky was more willing to discuss possible compromises to be given to the DNR and LNR on their sovereignty, to establish peace. Following the defeats and halt of the process, Kremlin also looked favourably to a peace negation. However, with the shift of scales in war, in favour of Ukraine, Zelensky, following his Amerian counterparts, said that Ukraine is winning and will win the war, effectively setting back the talks on a possible peace. As Kissinger said, many argue that Ukraine will have to accept the borders of the *status quo ante bellum*.

Putin, based the *jus ad bellum* for the Russian invasion on historical and political facts, stating that Ukraine is a *de jure* part of Russia and should be united with it—in his interview with Tucker Carlson[9]. Today's world can be defined as a multi-polar world order, with the US come forward as the hegemonic power, followed by Russia, China and the EU. Russia has been increasingly concerned over the NATO expansions near its borders and the Western approach. It can be said that as a result of the security dilemma, Russia felt threatened and reacted to protect its national security—the new security order created in Europe and West, left Russia alone and disintegrated, which seems to be the base reason for its increasing security concerns. The same, however, is true for Ukraine, Sweden or Finland as well— since they approached to NATO, fearing the hegemonic power and influence of Russia. Thus, creating Russia's *jus ad bellum*. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the Russian war strategy and involvement of civilians, it is not possible to say that Russia obeyed to the principles of *jus in bello*—resulting with the conclusion that Russia is not fighting a Just War. Having a legitimate or justifiable reason is not enough for a war to be legitimate and just.

"Egon Bahr, a major politician of the Social Democratic Party, who insisted in his personal conversations with the Soviet leadership on the brink of the collapse of the Soviet Union that a new security system should be established in Europe. Help should be given to unify Germany, but a new system should also be established to include the United States, Canada, Russia, and other Central European countries. But NATO needs not to expand. That's what he said: if NATO expands, everything would be just the same as during the Cold War, only closer to Russia's borders. That's all. He was a wise old man, but no one listened to him. In fact, he got angry once (we have a record of this conversation in our archives): 'If, he said,

you don't listen to me, I'm never setting my foot in Moscow again.' He was frustrated with the Soviet leadership. He was right, everything happened just as he had said.

(…) And let's get into the fact that after 1991, when Russia expected that it would be welcomed into the brotherly family of 'civilized nations,' nothing like that happened. You tricked us (I don't mean you personally when I say 'you,' of course, I'm talking about the United States), the promise was that NATO would not expand eastward, but it happened five times, there were five waves of expansion. We tolerated all that, we were trying to persuade them, we were saying: 'Please don't, we are as bourgeois now as you are, we are a market economy, and there is no Communist Party power. Let's negotiate.

(…) Well, I became President in 2000. I thought: okay, the Yugoslav issue is over, but we should try to restore relations. Let's reopen the door that Russia had tried to go through. And moreover, I've said it publicly, I can reiterate. At a meeting here in the Kremlin with the outgoing President Bill Clinton, right here in the next room, I said to him, I asked him, 'Bill, do you think if Russia asked to join NATO, do you think it would happen?' Suddenly he said: 'You know, it's interesting, I think yes.' But in the evening, when we had dinner, he said, 'You know, I've talked to my team, no-no, it's not possible now.' You can ask him, I think he will watch our interview, he'll confirm it.

(…) I will give you another example now, concerning Ukraine. The US leadership exerts pressure, and all NATO members obediently vote, even if they do not like something. Now, I'll tell you what happened in this regard with Ukraine in 2008, although it's being discussed, I'm not going to open a secret to you, say anything new. Nevertheless, after that, we tried to build relations in different ways. For example, the events in the Middle East, in Iraq, we were building relations with the United States in a very soft, prudent, cautious manner.

I repeatedly raised the issue that the United States should not support separatism or terrorism in the North Caucasus. But they continued to do it anyway. And political support, information support, financial support, even military support came from the United States and its satellites for terrorist groups in the Caucasus.

I once raised this issue with my colleague, also the President of the United States. He says, 'It's impossible! Do you have proof?' I said, 'Yes.' I was prepared for this conversation and I gave him that proof. He looked at it and, you know what he said? I apologise, but that's what happened, I'll quote. He says, 'Well, I'm going to kick their ass.' We waited and waited for some response – there was none.

I said to the FSB Director: 'Write to the CIA. What is the result of the conversation with the President?' He wrote once, twice, and then we got a reply. We have the answer in the archive. The CIA replied: 'We have been working with the opposition in Russia. We believe that this is the right thing to do and we will keep on doing it.' Just ridiculous. Well, okay. We realised that it was out of the question.

(…) The third moment, a very important one, is the moment when the US missile defense (ABM) system was created. The beginning. We tried for a long time to persuade the United States not to do it. Moreover, after I was invited by Bush Jr.'s father, Bush Sr. to visit his place on the ocean, I had a very serious conversation with President Bush and his team. I proposed that the United States, Russia and Europe jointly create a missile defense system that, we believe, if created unilaterally, threatens our security, despite the fact that the United States officially said that it was being created against missile threats from Iran. That was the justification for the deployment of the missile defense system. I suggested working together – Russia, the United States and Europe. They said it was very interesting. They asked me, 'Are you serious?' I said, 'Absolutely'" ("Interview…").

Regarding the US missile defence system's creating a few things should be stated.

Traditional or classic deterrence is based on traditional military capacity; army, air force and navy, used for deterring any attack on the territories of the state. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are a different kind of deterrent; they are not used in warfare as the purpose of a nuclear weapon is not to use it, and rather pursue a policy of deterrence or threat of retaliation. States use nuclear retaliation to deter any attack to itself. An important concept of deterrence is "mutually assured destruction," which is the understanding that no state can win a nuclear war as it has heavy costs, meaning that if a nuclear war happens between two nuclear states, it will destroy both of them. Stability is established in the international system by the possession of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, and their nuclear capability.

As a result of an understanding of mutually assured destruction, there have been secret and open talks between the Soviet Union and US regarding disarmament and arms control. These negotiations resulted with different arms control treaties. In 1972 ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) was signed, which keeps the societies as "hostages" to each other. The US withdraw from ABM Treaty in 2001 to build air and missile defence systems, and developed air and missile defence of Poland as well, in response, Russia announced its withdrawal from START II treaty in 2002. In 2019, the US withdraw from INF as a result of aggressive Russian policies on Ukraine and its control over Syria. Withdrawal from these bi-lateral agreements are signs of growing tension between superpowers in the post-Cold War era.

This act of creation of the US missile defence system was a crucial point in which Russia was concerned over its own national security, since the security guarantees were dismissed by the US.

> "I was told it was very interesting. I said, 'Just imagine if we could tackle such a global, strategic security challenge together. The world would change. We'll probably have disputes, probably economic and even political ones, but we could drastically change the situation in the world.' He says, 'Yes.' And asks: 'Are you serious?' I said, 'Of course.' 'We need to think about it,' I was told. I said, 'Okay.'

> Then Secretary of Defense [Robert] Gates, former Director of the CIA, and Secretary of State [Condoleezza] Rice came here, to this cabinet. Right here, at this table, they sat on this side. Me, the Foreign Minister, the Russian Defense Minister – on that side. They said to me, 'Okay, we have thought about it, we agree.' I said, 'Thank God, great.' – 'But with some exceptions.'

> (…) It was right then when I said: 'Look, but then we will be forced to take counter measures. We will create such strike systems that will certainly overcome missile defense systems.' The answer was: 'We are not doing this against you, and you do what you want, assuming that it is not against us, not against the United States.' I said, 'Okay.'

> Very well, that's the way it went. And we created hypersonic systems, with intercontinental missiles, and we continue to develop them. We are now ahead of everyone – the United States and other countries – in terms of the development of hypersonic strike systems, and we are improving them every day.

> But it wasn't us, we proposed to go the other way, and we were pushed back.

> Now, about NATO's expansion to the East. Well, we were promised, no NATO to the East, not an inch to the East, as we were told. And then what? They said, 'Well, it's not enshrined on paper, so we'll expand.' There were five waves of expansion, the Baltic states, the whole of Eastern Europe, and so on.

> And now I come to the main thing: they have come to Ukraine ultimately. In 2008 at the summit in Bucharest they declared that the doors for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO were open.

> And during the elections in already independent, sovereign Ukraine, which gained its independence as a result of the Declaration of Independence, and, by the way, it says that Ukraine is a neutral state, and in 2008 suddenly the doors or gates to NATO were open to

it. Oh, come on! This is not how we agreed. Now, all the presidents that have come to power in Ukraine, they've relied on the electorate with a good attitude to Russia in one way or another.

So, in 2008 the doors of NATO were opened for Ukraine. In 2014, there was a coup, they started persecuting those who did not accept the coup, and it was indeed a coup, they created a threat to Crimea which we had to take under our protection. They launched a war in Donbass in 2014, using aircraft and artillery against civilians. This is when it started. There is a video of aircraft attacking Donetsk from above. They launched a large-scale military operation, then another one. When they failed, they started to prepare the next one. All this against the background of military development of this territory and opening of NATO's doors.

How could we not express concern over what was happening? From our side, this would have been a culpable negligence – that's what it would have been. It's just that the US political leadership pushed us to the line we could not cross because doing so could have ruined Russia itself. Besides, we could not leave our brothers in faith and, in fact, a part of Russian people, in the face of this 'war machine' ("Interview…").

It can be said that Russia's concerns over its national security, with regards to NATO expansion to its borders was one of the main reasons of the war. The peace talks are not effectively progression because of the same reason as well. Thus, it is important to resolve security issues and concerns to create an environment in which parties can discuss the establishment of peace.

12. The European Security Order

Marking the start of a new era in the European security order, the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act was signed by NATO, and the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as various European nations, setting the Cold War principles like non-aggression and respecting to the state's sovereignty. With the Cold War coming to an end, these states adopted the 1990 Charter of Paris, initiating a new security framework in Europe focused on democracy, rule of law, and no longer viewing each other as adversaries. The 1990 "Two Plus Four Treaty" outlined the principles of Germany's unification. Through the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the US and Soviet Union, intermediate-range missiles were eliminated, and the number of tactical nuclear weapons were decreased. The 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) committed NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their military capabilities and ensure regional stability. "The CFE Treaty had only come into force in 1992, after the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had dissolved. But even from Moscow's point of view, it continued to have strategic importance for the stability of Europe because it limited NATO to its geopolitical status of 1990 and safeguarded its geographical distance from Russia" (Richter 4). With NATO negotiating on Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary's membership, Russia interpreted this as a violation of the earlier treats—marking the return of the geopolitical rivalry in Europe.

However, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act aimed to enhance security cooperation and adjust the CFE Treaty to the new geopolitical context, limiting troop deployments and stressing non-expansion of nuclear forces in new member states. "At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, the CFE States Parties signed the CFE Adaptation Agreement (ACFE). In parallel, all OSCE participating States adopted the Charter for European Security. In it, they reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of creating a common area of equal and indivisible security. No state or organization could claim primary responsibility for the preservation of European security or assert special zones of influence. Nevertheless, every state had the right to join an alliance or to remain neutral. However, states should respect their mutual security interests and not strengthen their security at the expense of other states" (Richter 5).

The ACFE has not been ratified due to a block by the United States during George W. Bush's presidency, starting in 2001. The U.S. blocked the ratification arguing that Russia was not fulfilling its commitments to withdraw forces from Georgia and Moldova—which was important for Ukraine and Georgia's admission into NATO. Despite Russia fulfilling some of these commitments, such as withdrawing from

Georgia by 2007, the U.S. maintained its stance, influenced by broader geopolitical manoeuvres and a lack of consensus within NATO regarding the status of Russian peacekeepers in conflict areas. NATO continued its expansion in 2004, with members from Eastern Europe joining—which created potential military deployment areas along Russia's border outside of existing arms control agreements. The US also unilaterally established a military presence on the Black Sea and pursued missile defence systems in Eastern Europe (in Poland), escalating tensions. Russia responded by dismissing its obligations under existing security frameworks and supporting separatists in Georgia. Additionally, US withdrawal from the ABM in 2002, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and other developments caused the US-Russian relations to become tense. Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in 2007, as a response to the US actions. Issues over Kosovo's independence and the events following the 2008 NATO Bucharest decisions also contributed to this process.

> "The erosion of security arrangements for Europe points to a deeper root cause of the Ukraine conflict. Moscow is concerned with strategic parity with the US and with preventing geopolitical disadvantages that might result from NATO enlargement. In particular, Ukraine's NATO accession would rupture traditional ties with pro-Russian ethnic groups in the east of the country, create more NATO stationing areas in close proximity to Central Russian regions, and expand the US military presence in the Black Sea region to the Don River. Moscow sees its actions as legitimized, like those of the US in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, to protect strategic security interests" (Richter 7).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused the existent European security order to be effectively abolished, the future developments remaining uncertain as the war continues.

13. The Privatization of Security

The privatization of security and security matters has increased significantly in the last decade, around the globe. The US was one of the leading states in this trend, using various private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia followed this trend afterwards, using "semi-state" PMCs.

13.1. Defining Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs)

> "McFate distinguishes 'PMCs' from within a broader group of 'private security companies' (PSCs), based on their functions. Some broader PSCs gather and analyse intelligence, act as bodyguards or guards at physical installations, or are contractors who provide food, housekeeping, and other goods and services to state military forces in the field. A single firm can serve multiple functions, depending on the context and contract. But a very specific type of service is provided by what are properly called PMCs, according to McFate, which form a small minority of the huge number of PSCs now involved in military contracting. PMCs are 'expeditionary conflict entrepreneurs,' who 'kill or train others to kill' in foreign settings. This definition is similar to what Peter W. Singer earlier called 'military provider firms,' those working at the tactical level and 'engaging in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists (for example, combat pilots) and/or direct command and control offield units'. PMCs primarily hire military veterans, often those with a special-forces background" (Marten 183).

The DNR and LNR forces are considered as the military force of the separationist provinces, however their composition remains to be a question. Usage of militias, paramilitary organizations and PMCs has no real difference when the state sovereignty is the concern.

13.2. The Legitimization of PMCs

The difference between PMCs and mercenaries are given based on the understanding that PMCs are contractor—that act like corporations, they aim to extend their client bases as well, and controlled private violence creators, whereas mercenaries' main goal is profit. The Russian law recognizes the PSCs, however it does not recognize the existence of PMCs. Some of the Russian PSCs have been guarding the Russian oil and gas facilities in Iraq since 2000, and with the law passed in 2007, state-controlled Gazprom and Trasneft were guaranteed the right to employ PSCs for law enforcement

and stopping any criminal activity inside their facilities. "In March 2018, the Russian cabinet of ministers (…) refused to consider legalization of Wagner or other PMCs, with the argument that 'mercenary' behavior violates the Russian Constitution and that state authorities alone have responsibility for defense and security. It was further reported that the cabinet believed a private army could destabilize the country–even though such Russian 'private armies' in effect already exist" (Marten 184). Yet, Putin acknowledge the existence of the Wagner Group.

> "What makes this situation especially unusual is that most major powers in the international system have all legalized and regulated PMCs. The other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)–the United States, United Kingdom, France, and China, strong states all–were indeed each original signatories of the 2008 International Committee of the Red Cross Montreux Document on international good practices for PMC employment in armed conflict.4In large part responding to the oversight problems the United States faced with contractors such as the notorious Blackwater in Iraq, stakeholders including states, human rights non-governmental organizations, and PMCs themselves (who were worried about reputational effects on their businesses) all signed on to this non-binding agreement that defined expectations, monitoring, and oversight responsibilities for the use of these groups. While the global legal ambiguities of PMC use are far from resolved, the legitimacy and wide acceptance of the Montreux Document has had a marked impact on both PMC activities and the willingness by states to regulate them.
>
> We would not expect a political system like Russia's to be a leader in implementing the rule of law for contractors. In this sense China is the most like Russia among the five UNSC great powers, with a state characterized by authoritarianism, dominated by informal personal networks, and beset by corruption. China's path of security privatization is distinct from that of Western countries, involving a lot more state command and control over profit-seeking enterprises. But Beijing has not followed Russia's path on PMCs. Not only was China one of the original signatories at Montreux; it has also formed around 20 legally recognized foreign-operating PMCs to provide protection to enterprises operating on its far-flung Belt and Road Initiative, including in conflict-ridden Pakistan. While China continues to face big questions about PMC capability, competence, and use, its choices in regard to legalizing PMCs look starkly different from Russia's" (Marten 185).

Employment of PMCs in Russia, is often said to be related with its history with Cossacks. Keeping these companies, and Wagner in particular, gave Russian authorities to be able to deny their existence and use them in secret foreign mission and undercover operations, giving them a movement area in the informational warfare. PMCs are often used by the Russian military forces, however research suggests that the Russian oligarch and influential people close to Putin may also resort to them for personal interests.

> "Indeed, some analysts suggest that it is in Putin's interest to keep PMCs illegal–since keeping them perpetually off balance is a mechanism for controlling them, either by Putin as an individual, or by the FSB as an institution. If they are operating illegally, then they can be threatened with imprisonment at any time–and that might help ensure their loyalty. Kirill Rogov argues that the Russian system is built around illegality with the full knowledge that rules will be broken–but that there are both rules for breaking the rules, and rules about who may break the rules and who may not. Rogov argues, 'any bureaucratic body with authority does not concern itself with the observance of rules, but instead with the punishment of any unsanctioned infringement'. Keeping activities illegal thereby limits competition, ensuring that only favored groups are allowed to operate. Alena Ledeneva provides a similar perspective on the Russian system, arguing that the way personal trust is built across Putin's entire regime is through mutual threats of exposure. When everyone has done things that leave them compromised (as Wagner and groups like it have done, by operating illegally), their mutual loyalty is assured, since no one has an incentive to disrupt the 'circular guarantee' that binds them all together in illegal activity.

(…) If this explanation is correct, it implies that the integrity of Russian sovereignty may be gradually falling victim to wealthy patrons and their mercenaries, who use personal connections to flout state law and potentially embroil the Russian state in conflicts abroad. This would indicate that groups such as Wagner are actually undermining state rationality, by leaving the state hostage to private interests. If this is happening, then Russia might be on its way to employing PMCs as what Avant has termed a corrupt and authoritarian 'weak state,' although she uses the label to refer to post-colonial states that never established firm civilian control over capable militaries. Other scholars have termed the out-of-control mercenaries scenario a 'racketeer market for force'" (Marten 188).

13.3. Security Challenges Regarding PMCs and PSCs

The right of legitimate use of violence and force is in the monopoly of the state, as Hegel argues. The monopoly of violence is important, as states are public institutions and are bounded by their constitutions and domestic laws, as well as international agreements, if they have ratified. However, semi-state security forces, PMCs and PSCS are non-governmental armed groups—not bounded and hard to control. If a state commits a crime or abuse of power, use illegitimate force, the bureaucratic personnel who is responsible for the said action can be put on trial domestically, and the state may be brought to the UN, ECHR or ICJ. The guarantee state provides that it is institutionalized and anyone that is a part of it is well known by the public and they are obliged by the state's constitution, whereas paramilitary groups and their leader may escape from law enforcement and trial. Most importantly the state is responsible to its citizens—the public.

Use of paramilitary groups creates unpredictable situations to use paramilitary groups as they are not the standing armed force of the state, and bounden by private contracts. Privatization of security was proved to be a risky movement as it can be seen from the *coup d'état* by the Wagner Group—a PMC rebelling against the sovereign state's own military force's head shows that the monopoly over force is lost and the sovereignty of the state is under threat. The state's institutions can use the sovereign force given to them—Wagner group's accusations on the government officials' treachery and the self-proclaimed law enforcement movement is against this principle. During the Wagner rebellion, Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president, stated that "the world will be put on the brink of destruction" if Wagner successfully completed their coup and took control over government, and gain access to nuclear arsenal of Russia. A PMC having access to nuclear weapons or any kind of weapon of mass destruction would be disastrous, as their compliance with any treaty or how they would behave would be a mystery. The possibility of terrorist groups or other violent non-state actors (VNSAs) acquiring and even using WMD creates a significant treat for the international security. The threats posed by usage of WMD by states and non-state actors are different as states are more likely to be effected by deterrence policies and avoid the actual usage of nuclear weapons, whereas it is not possible to foresee what will a VNSA do. Thus, making the PMCs and paramilitary organizations a question of international security—in addition to the concerns over national security.

14. Energy and Food Security

14.1. Energy Sector

"Russia is responsible for about 10 per cent of global energy production and is a major exporter of all fossil fuels, accounting (by volume) for around 15 per cent of global coal trade, 10 per cent of global oil trade and 8 per cent of global gas trade in 2020. In that year, declining prices had led the total value of its fossil fuel exports to fall to $159 billion, some way below the 2013 peak of $414 billion. The EU imports 90 per cent of its gas consumption, with Russia providing 41.1 per cent of the bloc's imports of natural gas (and 35 per cent of total EU consumption), as well 26.9 per cent of imported oil (25 per cent of consumption) and 46.7 per cent of coal (20 per cent of consumption). Russia is by far the EU's largest source of imported energy; the EU imports 60 per cent of its total energy

needs. The UK is relatively independent of Russian energy exports, with only 4 per cent of its gas consumption and 8 per cent of oil consumption imported from Russia. Russia is the second largest supplier of oil and the fourth largest of natural gas (pipeline and liquefied natural gas – LNG) to China, by volume, and China is Russia's second largest coal market. However, Russia's exports of natural gas to China are expected to rise dramatically from about 10 billion cubic metres (m^3) in 2020 to about 100 billion m^3 by 2030, with the construction of new pipelines already being under way or approved – in comparison the combined capacity of Nord Stream 1 and 2 **(Map 18)** connecting Russia to Germany is 110 billion m^3" (Benton et al. 10-11).

Map 18: Russian Gas Pipelines

14.2. Food and Agriculture Sector

"According to an assessment by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in early 2022, Russia and Ukraine collectively account for just over one half of global trade in sunflower oil and seeds, around one-quarter of all traded wheat and barley, and around one-sixth of traded maize and rapeseed. The two countries are particularly critical suppliers to food-deficit countries across North Africa and the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia: by way of example, together Russia and Ukraine account for 100 per cent of Somalia's wheat imports, over 80 per cent of Egypt's, 75 per cent of Sudan's, and over 90 per cent of Laos's; and for around 95 per cent of sunflower oil imports into China and India. Russia is also a significant supplier of fertilizers, exporting around one-sixth of global trade in potassic fertilizers, more than one-tenth of nitrogenous fertilizers, and around one-sixth of mixed fertilizers (containing two or more of nitrogen, potassium and phosphate). Its neighbour and ally Belarus, which had already been subjected to international sanctions prior to the conflict, is also responsible for one-sixth of global potassic fertilizer exports. Together, Russia and Belarus account for around one-third of global potash exports, and form one-half of a cartelized global market (with the other half comprising Canada and the US) that dominates potash production and sets prices. Much of South and Central America, West Africa and Europe – including Ukraine itself – are heavily reliant on Russia and Belarus for their fertilizer imports, especially for potash. In addition, Russia dominates in the export of natural gas to fuel production of nitrogenous fertilizers across Europe" (Benton et al. 9).

14.3. Sanctions and Energy Security

With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia faced with extensive economic sanctions, that primarily targeted its energy sector. The EU has implemented bans on investments in Russia's energy industry and on dealings with major state enterprises like Gazprom and Rosneft, alongside planning to end all Russian oil and gas imports in the future. The US has also prohibited investments in Russian energy sector. These efforts were made to limit and cut off major revenue stream and funding from Russia, to limit its war efforts. Nevertheless, a complete energy embargo has been avoided to maintain some sort of leverage and as a result of the difficulty of quickly diversifying and finding alternative energy sources. The EU's response includes plans to drastically reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels by the end of the decade, expanding imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and boosting renewable energy production and energy efficiency. In contrast, the UK is pursuing longer-term energy security measures, such as issuing new licenses for North Sea oil and gas projects and investing in nuclear and offshore wind energy.

The potential disruption in energy supplies from Russia has led to dramatic increases in fossil fuel prices. By April 6, 2022, the price of oil had risen to $108 per barrel from below $80 at the start of the year. Natural gas prices in Europe spiked to €345 per megawatt hour in March from €100, and Australian coal futures hit a record $435 per tonne, three times the price at the year's beginning. While Russia plays a crucial role in global energy markets, it is not the only influencer of prices. OPEC's (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) decisions are also pivotal in shaping future price trends, with some predictions suggesting oil prices could rise to between $200 and $250 per barrel later in 2022. The potential for a long-term disruption in gas supply and a possible shift back to coal usage in Europe have also stimulated a strong demand in carbon futures markets, with carbon prices rising from €60/tonne in November 2021 to nearly €100/tonne by early 2022.

The high energy prices have direct effects on the fertilizer sector, that is heavily reliant on the energy sector. The current elevated prices of fertilizer are leading to changes in agricultural practices, such as reductions in the area sown and the quantity of fertilizer used, which could limit food production in the near future. The conflict has also influenced the grain markets significantly (Benton et al. 15-19).

14.4. Disturbances in the Energy Infrastructure

"The movement of goods in and out of the Black Sea region has become both more logistically challenging and significantly more expensive in the wake of the conflict, particularly with the closing of Ukraine's ports. The designation of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov as 'high risk' areas for shipping has pushed up insurance premiums in that industry, while fears over further sanctions on seaborne trade have prompted some shipping companies to freeze deals with Russian suppliers. Vessels face delays at ports elsewhere as additional customs checks are undertaken to ensure that no sanctions have been infringed. Rail connections between Ukraine and Russia were destroyed by Ukrainian troops soon after Russia's invasion, and the transit of rail freight between Asia and Europe is expected to be disrupted in the longer term both by economic sanctions and by private sector boycotts, likely prompting a shift to other modalities such as shipping. Impacts of the conflict on transportation costs are already becoming evident in the US: as demand for wheat pivots from the Black Sea to the US, the costs of exporting grain from the Gulf of Mexico have risen to a near eight-year high.

(…) Despite the conflict, gas has continued to flow from Russia to the EU, with around one-half of those flows transiting Ukraine. At the end of March 2022, Gazprom said that it was supplying natural gas in line with requests from European countries but, on 25 March, the Russian government announced that Gazprom would have 'to accept payments in roubles'. Current economic sanctions make this very difficult for Western buyers, and prices have spiked further in response. With many of the supply contracts stipulating payments in US dollars or euros, and with the German

Map 19: Russia's List of Unfriendly Countries

government advising companies against paying in roubles, Russia changed its position on 5 April, announcing that the move to payment in roubles would be incremental for 'unfriendly states', **(Map 19)** rather than immediate. Despite the war, Russia continues to pay Ukraine for gas transit rights. However, if international financial sanctions are expanded to exclude Russia altogether from the SWIFT international payments system, this would increasingly affect the ability of both Russia and other countries to pay for, and to determine the currency of payment for, commodities such as gas.

Russia has also continued to export oil, although exports from the Caspian Pipeline Consortium were halted at the end of March. This was apparently due to storm damage, with the company claiming that repair work could be delayed due to the unwillingness of Western companies to supply parts. The shutdown halted the export of 1.4 million barrels a day of oil and led to a 5 per cent rise in the price of Brent crude. Flows of electricity have changed in recent years, with Ukraine having decoupled from the Russian electricity grid and become fully synchronized to the European network. The connection on 16 March of the Ukrainian and Moldovan grids was already planned, but has been accelerated to help increase grid stability in Ukraine.

Private sector actors have also stepped back from engagement with Russia. A number of oil and gas companies have announced that they would exit their share of oil and gas fields or companies. These include BP's 20 per cent stake in Rosneft; ExxonMobil's participation in the Sakhalin-I project in eastern Russia; Shell's joint venture with Gazprom in the Sakhalin-II project; and all of Norwegian company Equinor's Russian ventures. In the food and fertilizer sectors, a number of major private sector companies have discontinued or reduced operations in Russia: Bayer – a key supplier of agricultural inputs in Russia – has made its supply for 2023 contingent upon Russia 'stopping its unprovoked attacks on Ukraine and returning to a path of international diplomacy and peace" (Benton et al. 19-23).

15. Concluding on Security

The European security alliance and system seems to be collapsed as result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the failure to negotiate successful and efficient peace talks for returning to the *status quo ante bellum*. This is a moment of world making—similar to the events that happened during the decolonization period *vis-à-vis* the failure of the UN world. OSCE's European Charter on Security was supposed to set the norms for the approach of European continent to security matters. Failure of an existent system creates chaos, which can be only prevented by the emergence of a new order. When the Russo-Ukrainian war ends, one way or another—most probably, the Western countries will establish a new *corpus juris* for the revised European security norms.

When political scientists analyse the main reasons behind this conflict they ultimately agree that Russia felt that its national security was threatened—forcing Putin to follow the *raison d'État* and take measurements for the interest of the Russian state. Another view is that Russia followed its post-Soviet policy of re-gaining control and creating spheres of influence on former Soviet territories. Whatever it may be, it is certain that NATO's expansion towards the East and Russia's borders, with the Americans providing military support to the Eastern European countries—ABM and more, Russia felt that its sphere of influence and free movement area was getting smaller day by day, as it gets surrounded by hostile and unfriendly collective security alliances. As realists state, a nation's security is its ultimate interest, and it shall do anything to defend it or get in a position that it is better off in terms of security.

Integration is one of the many problems that is apparent. Russia is left out of the Eurozone, NATO, G7 and many other international organizations. As liberalists argue—with regards to international law and organizations, when states are not in communication and cooperation in a transparent environment that allows the nations to discuss their problems, they feel insecure. The lack of cooperation causes security dilemma, as states can never be sure of the intentions of others. Additionally, as commercial liberalism argues, lack of economic and financial relations may also contribute to the hostile environment. Russia uses coercive instruments to accomplish its foreign policy interests. Russia and the EU's relations are mostly asymmetric because of the EU's dependency on Russian energy—thus, as a result of this interdependency, especially in energy matters, EU stays neutral and continues the trade of oil and gas. EU's concerns over energy security seems to be decisive in the policy making process and determining the faith of the sanctions on Russia. It is speculated that Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022, to cut off the energy relations between Russia and EU—forcing EU to look for alternative resources.

Ukraine had already lost its *de jure* territories before the war in 2022, in previous events—the *de facto* situation in the region was favourable for Russians. In its foreign policy, Russia is careful to follow a

balance of hard and soft power, using media and various other tools in addition to its military strength. Putin seems to take international agreements and the understanding of a just war seriously. Russia is concerned about the legitimacy of their cause and use of force in Ukraine. Therefore, Putin gives historical justifications, making this a war of identities—as it is argued that there is no Ukrainian identity (referring to the "Little Russians"), it was only created artificially—in addition to humanitarian ones, especially during the invasion of Crimea in 2014. Putin argues that he activated the R2P as there were human rights violations—Russian speaking minorities and ethnic Russians were discriminated, and under threat, as they were not able to express their will and repressed by the Ukrainian neo-Nazis. The legitimacy of Putin's use of force is up to debate, however according to the UN law, as UNSC have not granted Russia the right to use force, there is no *jus ad bellum*. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the US and other major powers used illegitimate force in many occasions—such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and NATO bombing of Serbia and Libya. The principle of R2P becomes important here as being able to rightfully claim it can grant some level of legitimacy to the war.

With the Wagner *coup d'état* attempt, the danger of usage of PMCs, PSCs or any other paramilitary group become an important national security concern. The state is the ultimate sovereign and sole legitimate exerciser of the sovereign power—only state holds the monopoly over the use of violence. Considering that many state has weapons of mass destruction in their arsenals, a VNS getting access to the state capabilities is very dangerous for the international security.

16. Questions to be Addressed

1. How can European and global security norms be redefined and enforced following the collapse of previous security order?

2. Is it possible to integrate the rival states into the current international security system or how can a new inclusive framework be established that addresses its security concerns without compromising the sovereignty and security of other nations?

3. What measures can be taken or recommended to avoid territorial and strategic insecurities among member states.

4. How should European nations address their dependency on Russian energy in a manner that balances economic needs with geopolitical and security concerns?

5. What regulatory frameworks of disarmament should be implemented to control the activities of PMCs and other paramilitary groups to prevent them from destabilizing regions or acting on behalf of state interests without accountability?

6. Taking the national security concerns into account, what initiatives should be prioritized to rebuild the affected regions and restore peace and stability, after the conflict?

17. Recommended Further Reading

- "Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Regional Security" by Dr. Tamunopubo Big-Alabo and Dr. Emmanuel C. MacAlex-Achinulo. Link: academia.edu/download/85514726/3_1_.pdf

- Putin's interview with Tucker Carlson. Link: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/73411

- "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" by Vladimir Putin. Link: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

- "Civilizational Security: Why the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Shows that 'National Security' is Not Enough to Understand Geopolitics" by Greg Lewicki. Link: scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol89/iss89/11/

- "The Ukraine War and Threats to Food and Energy Security" by Tim G. Benton, Antony Froggatt and Laura Wellesley with Owen Grafham, Richard King, Neil Morisetti, James Nixey and Patrick Schröder. Link: researchgate.net/profile/Tamara-Ostashko/publication/373539835_GRAIN_EXPORT_OF_UKRAINE _IN_THE_CONDITIONS_OF_WAR/links/659ee6f5af617b0d873bb37a/GRAIN-EXPORT-OF-UKRAINE-IN-THE-CONDITIONS-OF-WAR.pdf

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